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The Origins of American Design Patent Protection
JASON J. DU MONT
MARK D. JANIS*
Many firms invest heavily in the way their products look, and they rely on a
handful of intellectual property regimes to stop rivals from producing look-alikes.
Two of these regimes—copyright and trademark—have been closely scrutinized in
intellectual property scholarship. A third, the design patent, remains little
understood except among specialists. In particular, there has been virtually no
analysis of the design patent system’s core assumption: that the rules governing
patents for inventions should be incorporated en masse for designs.
One reason why the design patent system has remained largely unexplored in
the literature is that scholars have never explained how and why the system came
to exist. This Article seeks to provide that account. We show how technological
innovation in early American manufacturing (especially in the cast-iron goods
industry) created unprecedented opportunities for creativity in industrial design
and a concomitant expansion in design piracy. We analyze manufacturers’
lobbying efforts that led to the first American legislative proposals for design
protection, and we connect those proposals to antecedents in British copyright and
design registration legislation. We also explain how these early proposals were
transmuted into design patent proposals, and we explore the idiosyncratic political
circumstances that surrounded the eventual passage of the design patent bill. We
conclude by reassessing the modern design patent regime in view of insights drawn
from our historical account.
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INTRODUCTION
In the space of a few weeks in late 2011, automaker Daimler AG sued an Asian
manufacturer for infringing patents on the diminutive “Smart Car”;1 Crocs, maker
of the eponymous (and wildly popular) rubber-molded footwear, filed a patent
infringement suit against Walgreens;2 Kohler sued a rival for infringing patents on
stainless steel sinks;3 and Apple and Samsung continued their worldwide battle
over smart phones and tablet computers.4 High-stakes, high-tech patent lawsuits
such as these have become the norm on civil dockets of many federal courts across
the country. What differentiates these suits is that they involve patents on designs—
that is, patents on a product’s visual appearance, not merely on the inventive
components that make it work.5 There are many other recent examples, and

1. Complaint for Trademark and Trade Dress Infringement, Trademark Counterfeiting,
Patent Infringement, Unfair Competition and Trademark Dilution, Daimler AG v.
Shuanghuan Auto. Co., No. 2:11-cv-13588-MOB-MAR (E.D. Mich. Aug. 17, 2011).
2. Complaint for Patent Infringement, Crocs, Inc. v. Walgreen, Co., No. 1:11-cv02954-MSK (D. Colo. Nov. 14, 2011).
3. Complaint, Kohler Co. v. Amerisink, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-00921-WEC (E.D. Wis. Oct.
3, 2011).
4. See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 678 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
5. See, e.g., 1 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 1502 (8th ed. rev. 2010)
(specifying that, in the context of design patents, design refers to “the visual characteristics
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application-filing trends suggest that intellectual property litigation over designs
will become increasingly common worldwide.6
Design patent cases routinely deal with the products of technological innovation,
but they also bring into confluence matters of consumer preference, aesthetics, and
even art. For example, litigation between Apple and Samsung over the design of
the iPad is as much about Steve Jobs’s and Jonathan Ive’s obsession with minute
aspects of visual aesthetics as it is about touch-screen technology;7 and it involves a
claim that devices depicted in Stanley Kubrick’s 1968 science fiction movie 2001:
A Space Odyssey so resemble the iPad that Apple’s design protection should be
declared invalid.8
Herein lies the problem. Intellectual property law has a fetish with
categorization; design, by contrast, is holistic, amorphous, and multivariate.9 It is
little wonder that fitting intellectual property law to design has proven so difficult.
After nearly two centuries of effort, there remain fundamental questions about how
best to craft legislative schemes that will facilitate innovation in industrial design.
The topic perennially appears on the U.S. legislative agenda, most recently in the
form of proposals to create special protection for fashion designs.10 A widerranging reexamination of design protection is underway in the United Kingdom.11
The design protection debate is one of intellectual property law’s most intractable,12
embodied in or applied to an article”).
6. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
INDICATORS 153–80 (2011) (reporting statistics on industrial design protection).
7. See, e.g., Nick Bilton, Steve Jobs: Designer First, C.E.O. Second, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
6, 2011, 1:37 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/06/steve-jobs-designer-first-c-e-osecond/.
8. Eriq Gardner, Is Apple’s iPad Copied From ‘2001: A Space Odyssey’?,
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/is-applesipad-copied-2001-227700 (providing a video clip from the movie scene at issue).
9. DISCOVERING DESIGN: EXPLORATIONS IN DESIGN STUDIES xiii, xvi (Richard
Buchanan & Victor Margolin eds., 1995) (characterizing design as “the science of the
artificial” and as “a new liberal art of industrial and technological culture”); ARTHUR J.
PULOS, AMERICAN DESIGN ETHIC: A HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL DESIGN TO 1940, at vii (1983)
(referring to design as “the indispensable leavening of the American way of life”); see also
Alice Rawsthorn, What Defies Defining, but Exists Everywhere?; A Hint: It’s Two Parts
Creation and One Part ‘Dastardly Plan,’ INT’L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 18, 2008, at 8 (quoting
a design historian for the proposition that “[d]esign is to produce a design to design a
design.”).
10. Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, H.R. 2511, 112th Cong.
(2011); BRIAN T. YEH, COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR FASHION DESIGN: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS IN THE 111TH CONGRESS (2010) (discussing, inter alia, S. 3728, a
fashion design protection bill that passed the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2010). On
earlier efforts, see David Goldenberg, The Long and Winding Road: A History of the Fight
Over Industrial Design Protection in the United States, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 21
(1997) (addressing proposals to enact new forms of design protection legislation in the
twentieth century).
11. INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, IPO ASSESSMENT OF THE NEED FOR REFORM OF THE
DESIGN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FRAMEWORK (2011).
12. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Past and Current Trends in the Evolution of Design
Protection Law—A Comment, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 387, 387 (1993)
(“[I]ndustrial design has posed the intellectual property world’s single most complicated
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engrossing decades of legislative effort in the United States alone.13 This debate has
become particularly heated and uncharacteristically mainstream following the
massive verdict against Samsung,14 the size of which may have been largely driven
by the presence of the design patents.
In the United States, we have never settled on a satisfactory answer to a basic
normative question: why should we use a patent system to protect industrial
designs? One reason that this question has proven so confounding and persistent is
that the antecedent historical question has not been adequately addressed: how (and
why) did the United States decide to create a patent system for designs? In this
Article, we answer this historical question. In doing so, we seek to provide a
foundation for resolving the normative question.
Our historical analysis of the intersection between intellectual property law and
design complements recent scholarly debates about design protection, but we have
different objectives and a different orientation. First, we do not confine our
discussion to the fashion industry, the focal point of recent scholarship.15 We are
more interested in examining how intellectual property regimes affect the industrial
design enterprise in the vast majority of industries—literally everything, including
the kitchen sink. Second, we orient our discussion around the design patent regime;
our chief objective is to understand how that regime should operate as one
paradigm among many others in contemporary design intellectual property.
Scholars have written very little about the design patent system.16
In Part I, we describe the existing U.S. design patent system and situate it within
the legal landscape of intellectual property protection for designs. We focus on two
chief points: (1) the design patent system’s traditionally plebeian status among U.S.
intellectual property regimes, contributing to a persistent problem that we describe
as design patent’s identity crisis; and (2) the thesis that the design patent system
originated as a historical accident.
In the remaining Parts, we offer a historical analysis of the design patent
system’s origins, aimed at discerning the role and identity of the design patent
system and at critically evaluating the claim that design patent is an accidental
intellectual property regime. Part II shows how technological advances in
puzzle.”).
13. E.g., In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214, 1218 n.1 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (Rich, J.,
concurring) (“Fabulous amounts of time and effort have been poured into solving the design
protection problem with, to date, no legislative solution.”).
14. See, e.g., Leo Kelion, Apple Versus Samsung: Jury Foreman Justifies $1bn Verdict,
BBC NEWS (Aug. 30, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-19425052.
15. See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of
Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (2009) (advocating a limited anti-copying right for fashion
design); cf. Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1776 (2006) (arguing that
“fashion’s cyclical nature is furthered and accelerated by a regime of open appropriation”
rather than a regime featuring stronger intellectual property protection).
16. Notable exceptions include Dennis D. Crouch, A Trademark Justification for Design
Patent Rights (Univ. of Mo. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2010-17, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656590; Jason J. Du Mont, A Non-Obvious Design:
Reexamining the Origins of the Design Patent Standard, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 531 (2010);
Janice M. Mueller & Daniel Harris Brean, Overcoming the “Impossible Issue” of
Nonobviousness in Design Patents, 99 KY. L.J. 419 (2010–2011).
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antebellum American manufacturing created opportunities for manufacturers to
incorporate design elements into mass-produced consumer goods and
simultaneously triggered a design piracy problem. Part III chronicles the origin and
evolution of legislative proposals that eventually matured into the design patent
provisions, the first form of American intellectual property protection covering
designs. We rely here on newly uncovered archival sources that reveal insights
about the lobbying influence of prominent manufacturers, the political agendas of
key intellectual property insiders, and connections with a legislative fight that
degenerated into one of the most serious political crises in antebellum America, the
fight over protectionist tariffs. We conclude in Part IV with some prescriptions for
doctrinal change in modern design patent law, informed by our historical analysis.
I. MODERN PERCEPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN DESIGN PATENT SYSTEM
The design patent system has led a long but quiet life. Many observers have
regarded it with ambivalence or written it off as an intellectual property
lightweight. From the limited commentary about the design patent system, two
themes emerge. First, some view the design patent system as having never
developed a distinctive identity, a raison d’être. Second, some dismiss the design
patent system as the product of historical accident. We discuss both views below,
arguing that these are two primary obstacles to the development of a more fully
theorized design patent system.
A. Design Patent’s Identity Crisis
The design patent system is, first, a patent system. The U.S. design patent
system is based primarily on three brief provisions that comprise Chapter 16 of the
general (utility) patent statute.17 These provisions impose the condition that designs
be “ornamental” in order to warrant protection,18 and they establish a fourteen-year
term of protection (measured from the date of grant),19 rules that are unique to
design patents. In most other respects, however, the modern design patent system
relies on substantive rules that were developed for patents on inventions—utility
patent rules. Indeed, perhaps the most important design patent provision is Section
171’s seemingly mundane incorporation clause, incorporating by reference “[t]he
provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions . . . .”20 That language,
applied over the course of more than a century and a half of utility patent law
evolution, has the effect of subjecting design patents to modern patent validity
conditions such as the requirement for nonobviousness21 and to the modern judicial

17. 35 U.S.C. §§ 171–73 (2006). A special remedies provision for design patent
infringement is codified separately. See 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 171.
19. 35 U.S.C. § 173; see also Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act of 2012, Pub. L.
No. 112-211, § 102, 126 Stat. 1527, 1532 (providing for a fifteen-year term).
20. 35 U.S.C. § 171; see Du Mont, supra note 16, at 578–82 (tracing the development
and expansion of the incorporation clause from its inception in the 1842 Act to its modern
incarnation).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
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framework for deciding questions of utility patent infringement.22 It also guarantees
that the complex provisions of the America Invents Act of 2011 apply to design
patents, even though the policy basis for that legislation emanated entirely from
debates over utility patent protection.23
Beyond its incorporation of substantive patent law rules, the design patent
system is also very much a patent system from an institutional perspective. Like
their utility patent counterparts, design patent applications are subject to
substantive, pre-grant examination administered by the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office.24 Design patent infringement matters are subject to the appellate jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—again, like utility patents.25
Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that the design patent right resembles the
utility patent right in terms of sheer economic power. Even accounting for the
recent design patent renaissance,26 design patents as a group have never achieved

22. That framework requires a construction of the patent’s claims, deemed to be a pure
question of law, followed by a rigorous comparison of each element of the construed claim
to the product accused of infringement. See, e.g., Absolute Software, Inc. v. Stealth Signal,
Inc., 659 F.3d 1121, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
23. See Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act and Its
Implications for Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1 (2012) (cataloguing the provisions of the
America Invents Act without mentioning their impact on design patents).
24. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 5, at ch. 1500.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006) (appeals from district courts in cases arising under
the patent laws); id. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (appeals from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
with respect to rejected patent applications).
26. When the Federal Circuit reformulated the law of design patent infringement in
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc),
predictions of a renaissance in design patent enforcement quickly followed. See, e.g., James
Juo, Egyptian Goddess: Rebooting Design Patents and Resurrecting Whitman Saddle, 18
FED. CIR. B.J. 429, 450 (2009) (predicting that the Egyptian Goddess decision “should
strengthen design patents, especially those that have been drafted with careful attention to
the novel features to be protected”); Myshala E. Middleton, Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa,
Inc.: Design Patent Infringement Revolutionized by an Egyptian Goddess, 17 U. BALT.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 179, 185 (2009) (Egyptian Goddess will serve to “streamline future
design patent infringement cases.”). In the time since Egyptian Goddess, the Federal Circuit
has handed down important new design patent decisions at an unusual pace. See, e.g.,
Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (analyzing design patent
functionality by assessing the functionality of individual design features rather than the
design as a whole); Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(applying the Egyptian Goddess infringement standard and remarking on claim
construction); Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (abandoning the point of novelty test as an element of the patentability analysis); Titan
Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (debating,
but not resolving, whether the standard for design patent obviousness should be modified in
view of Supreme Court developments in the law of obviousness for utility patents). Filings
for U.S. design patents have increased substantially, and this phenomenon is not confined to
the United States. See, e.g., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., 2012 WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY INDICATORS 9 (2012), available at http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/
intproperty/941/wipo_pub_941_2012.pdf (noting that design applications grew strongly in
2010–2011).

2013]

DESIGNING THE AMERICAN DESIGN PATENT SYSTEM

843

anything like the exclusionary power commonly attributed today to utility patents.
In the late 1980s, courts had arguably narrowed design patents so substantially that
Judge Rich remarked acerbically that “[d]esign patents have almost no scope.”27
Indeed, Jerry Reichman has argued that during the course of the twentieth century,
design patents had become trivial, functioning as little more than evidence of title
and of priority for filing foreign design applications.28 Courts are likely to treat
design patents more generously today—but, in a sense, this only adds to the
ambivalence over the design patent’s stature. Is it, and should it be, a real patent?
Notwithstanding the incorporation of the utility patent rules and institutional
framework, is the design patent a mysterious intellectual property right that simply
wears the patent moniker? A fuller historical analysis of the origin of the design
patent system could provide a foundation for answering these questions.
The emergence of copyright and trademark protection for designs has only
further complicated the problem of carving out a role for the design patent. As we
will discuss, when design patent protection was introduced in 1842, it was the sole
form of American intellectual property protection for designs.29 That is no longer
true. Under current U.S. law, designers may seek protection for many types of
designs under the copyright30 and trademark31 regimes and may hold those forms of
protection concurrently with design patent protection.32 In addition, vessel hull
designers may secure a special form of design protection administered within the
copyright system.33
As these forms of intellectual property protection developed, the domain of
design patents became increasingly more difficult to discern. Commentators argued
that the design patent system should give way in favor of one or more of these
other regimes: that it should be abolished in favor of sui generis legislation,34 that it

27. In re Mann, 861 F.2d 1581, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
28. J.H. Reichman, Design Protection After the Copyright Act of 1976: A Comparative
View of the Emerging Interim Models, 31 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 267, 298 (1983).
29. See infra Part III.B–C.
30. Designers may be able to secure copyright protection for designs as pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural works. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2006) (identifying pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works as a category of protectable work); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (supplying
relevant definitions).
31. Designers may seek to register distinctive and nonfunctional designs as trade dress
under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1096 (2006), or may claim unregistered trade
dress rights using Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
32. See In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (no requirement to elect
between design patent protection and copyright protection); In re Mogen David Wine Corp.,
372 F.2d 539, 545 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (no requirement to elect between design patent
protection and registered trade dress protection); In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d
925, 930 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (same). But cf. Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, 17 U.S.C.
§ 1329 (2006) (providing that the issuance of a design patent terminates vessel hull design
protection).
33. Vessel hull designs may be protected under the provisions of Chapter 13 in 17
U.S.C. GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADE DRESS AND DESIGN LAW 566–72
(2010) (explaining the relevant provisions).
34. Daniel H. Brean, Enough is Enough: Time to Eliminate Design Patents and Rely on
More Appropriate Copyright and Trademark Protection for Product Designs, 16 TEX.
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should be converted to a copyright model,35 and that it should be governed by
unfair competition principles.36
This has not occurred; instead, the design patent system has lingered. In the
copyright and trademark jurisprudence, the design patent system has become a
handy foil. For example, in Wal-Mart v. Samara Bros.,37 the Supreme Court cited
the theoretical availability of design patent protection as one rationale for adopting
an elevated standard of distinctiveness for product design trade dress protection.38
Similarly, some judges hold up design patent protection as a preferred alternative to
trade dress protection when invalidating trade dress protection on functionality
grounds.39 Earlier, in Mazer v. Stein,40 the Court declared that the existence of
design patent protection posed no obstacle to recognizing copyright protection for
designs of useful articles because design patent protection was so uncertain.41

INTELL. PROP. L.J. 325, 379–81 (2008) (arguing that the design patent system should either
be abolished or should be phased out and replaced with a system more akin to community
design protection); Note, Design Protection—Time to Replace the Design Patent, 51 MINN.
L. REV. 942, 959–61 (1967).
35. See, e.g., Roy V. Jackson, A New Approach to Protection for the Designs of New
Products, 38 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 448, 449 (1956) (arguing that design patent protection
should be converted to a system of “engineering copyright” or “copyright-design”); Henry
D. Williams, Copyright Registration of Industrial Designs, 7 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 540, 540
(1924) (arguing that the design patent laws are a “misfit” and have been “altogether
insufficient”). But cf. Frank W. Dahn, Designs—Patents or Copyrights, 10 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 297, 297 (1927) (discussing industrial design protection under the copyright and
design patent systems, noting that “it is immaterial in a broad sense whether this be done by
a copyright system or a patent system, so long as it is well done”).
36. Rudolf Callmann, Style and Design Piracy, 22 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 557 (1940)
(arguing that courts need to apply common law unfair competition law in design cases); see
also Cameron K. Wehringer, Two for One: Trademarks and Design Patents, 50 TRADEMARK
REP. 1158 (1960) (discussing the overlap between trademarks and design protection).
37. 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
38. Id. at 215–16 (holding that product design trade dress cannot qualify as inherently
distinctive as a matter of law). Similarly, Judge Easterbrook upheld the denial of a trade
dress claim on the grounds that the table leg design at issue was not distinctive, commenting
that the table manufacturer could have resorted to design patent or copyright protection to
attempt to thwart copying. Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Corp., 419 F.3d 576, 580
(7th Cir. 2005); see also Amy B. Cohen, Following the Direction of TrafFix: Trade Dress
Law and Functionality Revisited, 50 IDEA: INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 593, 696 (2010) (arguing
that design patent and copyright alone suffice to provide adequate protection for designs, and
that design protection as trade dress under the Lanham Act should be eliminated).
Additionally, aesthetic and utilitarian functionality doctrines can create insurmountable
hurdles for those claiming trade dress protection. See Industria Arredamenti Fratelli Saporiti
v. Charles Craig, Ltd., 725 F.2d 18, 19–20 (2d Cir. 1984).
39. See, e.g., Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek, 615 F.3d 855, 861 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“Franek chose to pursue a trademark, not a design patent, to protect the stylish circularity of
his beach towel. He must live with that choice.” (citation omitted)); see also Jason J. Du
Mont & Mark D. Janis, Functionality in Design Protection Systems, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
261, 281–82 (2012) (comparing the use of the functionality doctrine in design patent law to
its use in trade dress law).
40. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
41. Id.; see also BARBARA RINGER, DRAFT: SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE
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Decisions and commentary that attempt to capture the design patent system’s
purpose by articulating its incentives rationale likewise leave us with many
questions about the nexus between the design and utility patent systems. The most
venerable comments—those of the Supreme Court in 1870 in Gorham Co. v.
White42—assert merely that the design patent provisions “were plainly intended to
give encouragement to the decorative arts,”43 a reference to the Constitution’s
intellectual property clause,44 with a slight adaptation for designs.45 This strikes us
as a placeholder recitation that reveals very little about whether the design patent
system was intended to be robustly patent-like, since analogous constitutional
language would be used to justify a design copyright scheme. Yet more recent
rulings merely absorb the Gorham incantation without question. Indeed, in its
recent landmark ruling on design patent infringement, the en banc Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit declared that the Gorham decision was “[t]he starting point
for any discussion of the law of design patents.”46
More recently, some scholars have shifted the focus to trademarks, exploring the
connections between design patent protection and trademark incentive rationales.
For example, Dennis Crouch has argued that design patents should be understood
as an “alternative rule of evidence” for establishing trade dress rights.47 Similarly,
Barton Beebe has suggested that the primary purpose of design patents is to
incentivize product differentiation—to encourage producers to create and maintain
distinctiveness, which is reminiscent of the trademark system’s function.48 In the
case of high-technology consumer goods, as Beebe points out, consumers cannot
readily evaluate whether the components of the goods provide superior
technological utility, so consumers rely instead on the visual characteristics of the
products as symbols of the product’s relative utility.49 The Gorham Court hints at a

REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 186
(1975) (indicating that design patents were believed to be “inadequate as a practical form of
protection” at the time of Mazer due to perceived judicial hostility, high cost, and delay
encountered in the examination process).
42. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 524 (1871).
43. Id.
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to create systems that would
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”).
45. Gorham, 81 U.S. at 525 (further suggesting that “[t]he law manifestly contemplates
that giving certain new and original appearances to a manufactured article may enhance its
salable value, may enlarge the demand for it, and may be a meritorious service to the
public”). The Court did cite a prior British design copyright case in support of its design
patent infringement standard. Id. at 526 (citing McCrea v. Holdsworth, [1866] 1 Q.B. 263
(Eng.)). We discuss the significance of British antecedents to American design patent law
infra Part III.
46. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 670 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
47. Crouch, supra note 16, at 48.
48. Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 809, 862–64 (2010). Beebe sees much in common doctrinally between design patent
and trademark. Id. at 863.
49. Id. at 864 (asserting that “[d]esign patents enable the designers of [high-technology
consumer] products to convert the absolute utility that they have created into clearly
demonstrable (and protectable) forms of relative utility, which may be the primary form of
utility that high-technology consumers ultimately desire”).
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product differentiation rationale, asserting that the law presumes that the designer’s
act of “giving certain new and original appearances to a manufactured article may
enhance its salable value, may enlarge the demand for it, and may be a meritorious
service to the public.”50 Beebe goes further, asserting that design protection laws,
including design patent laws, “are probably the clearest examples we have of the
‘functional transformation’ of intellectual property law into a body of law being
used not simply to ‘promote the Progress,’ but also, and in tension with that goal, to
preserve our system of consumption-based differentiation in the face of copying
technology that threatens to undermine it.”51 For Beebe, this illustrates a broader
distinction between “progressive” intellectual property (denoting intellectual
property systems that seek to promote “progress” in the sense of advances in
absolute utility) and sumptuary intellectual property (which merely strive to
preserve differentiation among products).52
We have some sympathy for Beebe’s argument, but for us it warrants closer
historical scrutiny. Did the proponents of the original design patent system presume
that industrial designers would supply “not so much beauty as distinction?”53 Or is
it more likely that designers historically have sought to supply both beauty and
distinction, a combination that is very difficult to disaggregate? 54 And, if so, what
does this tell us about shaping incentives through a design patent system?55
Historical analysis has something to contribute here, even if it does not yield tidy
answers.

50. Gorham, 81 U.S. at 525. Further strands of this rationale can be seen in the Court’s
description of the substantial similarity test for infringement—finding infringement where,
“in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually
gives, . . . the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase
one [(i.e., the allegedly infringing design)] supposing it to be the other [(i.e., the patented
design)].” Id. at 528.
51. Beebe, supra note 48, at 862.
52. Id. at 840.
53. Id. at 865.
54. In addition, as Beebe sees it, progressive intellectual property is oriented towards
preventing substitutive copying, while sumptuary intellectual property seeks to prevent
dilutive copying. Id. at 866–67. That may be true for high-end fashion designs, where, as
Beebe points out, it seems unlikely that purveyors of luxury fashion items actually lose sales
because ordinary consumers choose cheap counterfeits instead. Id. at 867. But we are not
confident that this same generalization would have extended across many types of consumer
goods manufacturers historically, where mimicry could plausibly have been both substitutive
and dilutive.
55. For an argument that design patent rights and trademark rights supply comparable
incentives, see Crouch, supra note 16, at 44 (asserting that design patent scope is so narrow
that it could only provide low-level investment in design innovation and that consumer
demand alone might extract this level of innovation). But these observations could point
towards copyright incentives just as readily as they could point towards trademark
incentives.
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B. The “Historical Accident” Thesis
Lastly, on the rare occasions when courts and commentators have focused
directly on the design patent system’s genesis, they have tended to accept the
proposition that the design patent system came about without deliberation. The
eminent commentator Stephen Ladas dismissively characterized the passage of
American design patent legislation as a “historical accident,”56 and others seem to
have accepted this view.57 One historical commentary—and, until recently, the only
account directed to the history of the design patent system—goes only a bit deeper.
Thomas B. Hudson’s A Brief History of the Development of Design Patent
Protection in the United States58 posits that the original design patent legislation
passed because the Commissioner of Patents, Henry Ellsworth, recommended it in
an annual Commissioner’s Report to Congress presented in early 1842,59 and, a few
months later, Congress dutifully adopted Ellsworth’s recommendation.60 Hudson
no doubt drew upon design patent treatises tracing back to the nineteenth century,
which, likewise, presented the creation of the design patent system as an Ellsworthinspired fait accompli, or simply cited the 1842 Act without any background.61
These summary explanations intrigued us. We sensed that there was more to be
told62 and that telling it would be important in light of the ultimate normative

56. STEPHEN P. LADAS, II PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 830 (1975).
57. See, e.g., Orit Fischman Afori, Reconceptualizing Property in Designs, 25 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1105, 1142 (2008); Richard W. Pogue, Borderland—Where Copyright and
Design Patent Meet, 52 MICH. L. REV. 33, 62 (1953); Kenneth B. Umbreit, A Consideration
of Copyright, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 932, 934 (1939) (asserting that “[t]he fact that the law of
design patents is following the precedents of mechanical patents rather than of copyrights is
an accident of administration” and urging that “[i]t is due to their name and to their
subjection to the jurisdiction of the Patent Office”).
58. 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 380 (1948). In fairness to Hudson, his account aimed
primarily at describing the evolution of the design patent system in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, not at the factors that originally motivated Congress to enact
design patent legislation.
59. See infra notes 182–93 and accompanying text. As we discuss, Ellsworth’s report
referred to the existence of design protection in “other nations,” undoubtedly meaning the
1839 British copyright and design legislation. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
60. Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 543–44 (1842) [hereinafter Act of
Aug. 29, 1842]; Hudson, supra note 58, at 381. Hudson does augment this account by briefly
speculating why design patent protection took the form of patent protection, but he cites no
support. Id. at 381–83. We analyze Hudson’s conjectures infra Part III.B, questioning some
but agreeing with others.
61. See, e.g., HECTOR T. FENTON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR DESIGNS 1–2 (1889)
(referencing the 1842 Act as the first design patent act without additional background);
WILLIAM EDGAR SIMONDS, THE LAW OF DESIGN PATENTS 173 (1874) (same); WILLIAM
LEONARD SYMONS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR DESIGNS 5 (1914) (same).
62. Here we found particularly important the work by Brad Sherman and Lionel Bently,
showing that, in British law, early design legislation served as a prominent but littleappreciated prototype for the eventual crystallization of modern notions of property rights in
intangibles and modern structures of intellectual property laws. BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL
BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE,
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problem of defining a role for the design patent system in future debates about
intellectual property protection for designs. We attempt to provide more lucid and
more fully contextualized explanations in the analysis presented in the following
Parts.
II. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION, DESIGN PIRACY, AND THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN
DESIGN PROTECTION
As we will show in this Part, the design patent regime emerged in response to
the imperatives of technological innovation. We focus on the technological change
in a leading antebellum American industry, the manufacture of cast-iron goods. We
explain how technological innovation made it feasible for manufacturers to
incorporate design features into mass-produced consumer goods, ushering in both
the enterprise of American industrial design and the concomitant enterprise of
American domestic design piracy.
A. Innovation and Design Piracy in American Antebellum Manufacturing
In the 1830s, American manufacturers produced cast-iron goods63 directly from
iron ore using large blast furnaces located near iron ore sources and navigable
waterways.64 Blast iron furnaces produced goods that were usually very coarse,
heavy, and unrefined.65 Furnace operators did not specialize in particular products,
so they had little interest in developing ornamentation or aesthetically pleasing
configurations for particular products.66 Indeed, blast furnace operators were more
concerned with the composition of the iron than the casting’s aesthetics.
Jordan L. Mott, a leading New York manufacturer,67 revolutionized the
processes for producing cast-iron goods, and, in short measure, became a principal
lobbyist for expanding American intellectual property protection, particularly with
regard to designs.68 Mott deserves mention as one of antebellum America’s
foremost entrepreneurs, and as one of its consummate patent system insiders—
credentials that he sought to preserve for posterity by commissioning a painting
that depicts him in the Great Hall of the Patent Office in imaginary conversation

1760–1911, at 63–76 (1999).
63. An iron “cast” or “casting” is the actual shape or product that is created by pouring
refined molten iron into a mold and allowing it to cool and solidify. See HUGH PHILIP
TIEMANN, IRON AND STEEL 44–45 (1910).
64. See generally FREDERICK OVERMAN, THE MANUFACTURE OF IRON, IN ALL ITS
VARIOUS BRANCHES 145–51 (1850) (depicting a typical blast furnace, fig. 49).
65. See IV JOHNSON’S NEW UNIVERSAL CYCLOPEDIA: A SCIENTIFIC AND POPULAR
TREASURY OF USEFUL KNOWLEDGE 585 (Frederick A. P. Barnard & Arnold Guyot eds.,
1878) [hereinafter JOHNSON’S NEW UNIVERSAL CYCLOPEDIA].
66. See DAVID R. MEYER, NETWORKED MACHINISTS: HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES IN
ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 110 (2006).
67. At one time, Mott’s sprawling real estate holdings encompassed most of Brooklyn.
See PROMINENT FAMILIES OF NEW YORK 420 (BiblioLife ed., 2009) (Lyman H. Weeks ed.,
1897).
68. See infra Part II.
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with Morse, Colt, Goodyear, and other legendary American inventors.69 His vanity
was not in question.
In the 1830s, Mott had begun producing the first practical coal-fired, cast-iron
stoves and had sold them to customers in New York City.70 At first, he did not
make his own castings; instead, he bought them from blast furnace operators who
produced them and shipped them to him for assembly.71 Seeking to end his
dependence on the blast furnace operators,72 Mott built a small-scale cupola furnace
in the city73 and, after some experimentation, determined how to produce his own
castings using pig iron.74 Compared to cast-iron plates made directly from ore by
blast furnaces, cupola furnaces produced thinner, lighter castings, but they were
more susceptible to cracking when heated.75 To overcome this problem, he
incorporated curves, fluting, and other features aimed at enhancing heat
dissipation.76
According to one account, Mott’s innovative process “gained the attention of
iron men, and before the close of the year cupola furnaces began to be erected, and

69. The painting is Men of Progress by Christian Schussele, circa 1857. For
background, see Henry Petroski, Men and Women of Progress, 82 AM. SCIENTIST 216, 216–
17 (1994). At about that same time, President Buchanan asked Mott to become the
Commissioner of Patents, but Mott ultimately declined. PROMINENT FAMILIES OF NEW YORK,
supra note 67, at 420.
70. Mott had secured utility patent protection for an anthracite-burning coal, and he had
determined how to use “pea-sized” coal (previously considered to be scrap) as stove fuel. 4
AMERICAN SUPPLEMENT TO ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA: A DICTIONARY OF ARTS, SCIENCES,
AND GENERAL LITERATURE 606 (J.M. Stoddart ed., 1889); Stoves, U.S. Patent No. 7,096X
(issued May 30, 1832). This innovation revolutionized the stove industry. JOHNSON’S NEW
UNIVERSAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 65, at 585.
71. See 2 J. LEANDER BISHOP, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURES FROM 1608 TO
1860, at 576–77 (3d ed. 1868) [hereinafter AMERICAN MANUFACTURES].
72. Mott became dissatisfied with the prices that blast furnace operators were charging
him, according to at least one account. Id. at 577.
73. See William Dundas Scott-Moncrieff, The Cupola Furnace and “Castings,” in
GREAT INDUSTRIES OF GREAT BRITAIN 111 (Cassell & Co. ed., 1884) (describing the cupola
furnace); AMERICAN MANUFACTURES, supra note 71, at 577 (describing the location of
Mott’s cupola furnace).
74. See AMERICAN MANUFACTURES, supra note 71, at 577.
75. Id. at 576–77.
76. Id. at 577 (“Mr. Mott made his plate patterns ‘from edge to edge longer than a
straight line,’ by pannelling, curving, fluting, or other device.”); Conversational Meeting of
the Mechanics Institute, Reported for the American Repertory, Subject Stoves (Feb. 1840)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia University Rare Book & Manuscript
Library, Mott Family Papers, Box 2). Signed “Ed’s Notes,” this manuscript appears to have
been produced during an interview with Jordan Mott while a member of the Mechanic’s
Institute. It notes that Mott’s insight concerning the stove’s surface area improved the iron’s
heat radiation properties to the point where they no longer had to line the stoves with brick.
For an example of one of Mott’s designs utilizing these techniques, see Stove & Fireplace,
U.S. Patent No. 50 (issued Oct. 11, 1836) (Figs. 1–3) (utilizing separate concentric rings in
scalloped, notched, and leaf patterns in order to dissipate heat but noting that their
“ornament” was “merely a thing of fancy, or taste”).

850

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:837

soon spread over the cities and villages of the Union.”77 Mott and others could now
cast their own stoves on a commercial scale.78 Subsequent advances in thin-casting
techniques, among other factors,79 facilitated explosive growth in the production of
a wide array of additional cast-iron goods, including “kitchen utensils, sugarkettles, bath-tubs, . . . cast-iron railings, fountains, and lawn ornaments.”80 Some of
Mott’s innovative stove and chair designs are depicted below.81

Once they adopted thin-casting techniques, Mott and other manufacturers
suddenly found that a new and unexpected opportunity for innovation had opened
to them. They could now add value to cast-iron consumer goods on a commercial
scale by crafting innovative, distinctive designs. That is, by incorporating
ornamentation, or by adopting daring new geometries for their products, they might
lend their products aesthetic appeal and simultaneously provide consumers a basis
for differentiating between competing products.
Iron goods manufacturers employed pattern makers who carved new patterns
using soft woods, plaster, or soft metals;82 casting molds were then made from the

77. AMERICAN MANUFACTURES, supra note 71, at 577. Some evidence suggests that
others in addition to Mott were experimenting with the use of cupola furnaces at the same
time. See Jeremiah Dwyer, Stoves and Heating Apparatus, in 2 ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF
AMERICAN COMMERCE 357, 361 (Chauncy M. Depew ed., 1895) (stating that Mott was “one
of the first to use a cupola for remelting iron for stove manufacture”).
78. See, e.g., RUTH SCHWARTZ COWAN, MORE WORK FOR MOTHER: THE IRONIES OF
HOUSEHOLD TECHNOLOGY FROM THE OPEN HEARTH TO THE MICROWAVE 60 (1983) (crediting
Mott as the first to actually “make” stoves, instead of just assembling them).
79. See Charles Huston, The Iron and Steel Industry, in 1 ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF
AMERICAN COMMERCE 320, 323 (Chauncey M. Depew ed., 1895) (noting that the growth of
the railroad network profoundly affected the growth of the iron industry); F.W. TAUSSIG,
THE TARIFF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 57 (6th ed. 1914) (attributing U.S. iron industry
growth in the 1830s principally to the introduction of anthracite coal-based smelting,
replacing charcoal smelting).
80. VICTOR S. CLARK, HISTORY OF MANUFACTURES IN THE UNITED STATES: 1607–1860,
at 504 (1916).
81. The featured design diagrams and their corresponding citations are listed from left to
right: Stove & Fireplace, U.S. Patent No. 50 fig. 3 (issued Oct. 11, 1836); Cast-Iron Chair,
U.S. Patent No. 5,317 fig. 1 (issued Oct. 2, 1847); Stove & Fireplace, U.S. Patent No. 50 fig.
2 (issued Oct. 11, 1836); and Parlor-Stove, U.S. Patent No. 508 fig. 1 (issued Dec. 7, 1837).
82. See ALONZO POTTER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENCE APPLIED TO THE DOMESTIC AND
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patterns.83 According to contemporary observers, the pattern maker’s design work
was “almost entirely executed by hand, entailing a heavy expense and the
consumption of considerable time.”84 Once made, the patterns could be used
repeatedly, so they were of great value, so much so that some firms created fireresistant “pattern houses” for their storage.85 Advertisements began to emphasize
the ornamental attributes of cast-iron goods,86 and, for the first time, some cast-iron
goods came to be perceived as works of art.87
The phenomenon was not confined to the cast-iron goods market. A more
general enterprise of American industrial design was beginning to emerge. As
Arthur Pulos points out, a consumer “could always depend on what his senses told
him” about a product even if he found the mechanics of the product to be baffling. 88
Many manufacturers “began to pay particular attention to the notion that artistic
values applied to utilitarian manufactures might also increase their saleability.”89
Still, American cast-iron goods designers had no apparent, formal intellectual
property mechanism available for capturing the value attributable to design.
Copyright protection was an obvious candidate (at least as viewed in retrospect),
but copyright protection did not embrace industrial creations, entirely omitting
protection for three-dimensional useful articles until many decades later90 and only
affording protection in limited instances for surface ornamentation applied to two-

MECHANIC ARTS, AND TO MANUFACTURES AND AGRICULTURE 214 (1860).
83. See generally Babbage on the Economy of Manufactures, 2 AM. RAILROAD J. &
ADVOC. INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS 353, 359 (1833) (“Patterns of wood or metal made from
drawings are the originals from which the moulds for casting are made: so that, in fact, the
casting itself is a copy of the mould, and the mould is a copy of the pattern.”); 2 SUPPLEMENT
TO SPONS’ DICTIONARY OF ENGINEERING 618–72 (Ernest Spon ed., 1880) (detailing the
casting process).
84. 4 AMERICAN SUPPLEMENT TO ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 70, at 606.
85. Ellen Marie Snyder, Victory over Nature: Victorian Cast-Iron Seating Furniture, 20
WINTERTHUR PORTFOLIO 221, 224 (1985).
86. See, e.g., Priscilla J. Brewer, “We Have Got a Very Good Cooking Stove”:
Advertising, Design, and Consumer Response to the Cookstove, 1815–1880, 25
WINTERTHUR PORTFOLIO 35, 43 (1990) (identifying an 1844 stove advertisement illustrating
that the stove’s appearance had become an important consideration in stove marketing);
Snyder, supra note 85, at 227 (noting that trade catalogues for cast-iron products extolled
their visual appearance and finding that even Mott’s catalogue grandly boasted that it
contained nothing that did “not possess some artistic merit”).
87. Snyder, supra note 85, at 226 (referring to a perception of cast-iron’s “aesthetic
elevation” to art).
88. PULOS, supra note 9, at 133.
89. Id.
90. The Act of July 8, 1870, defined copyrightable subject matter to include “statuary,
and . . . models or designs intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts.” Act of July 8,
1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212. In 1909, Congress amended the provision
substantially, deleting the “fine arts” language and providing that copyright protection could
extend to all works of authorship. See Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 4, 35 Stat. 1075,
1076. Eventually, in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), the Supreme Court concluded that
these changes extended copyright beyond the traditional fine arts to industrial designs such
as the statuettes at issue in Mazer, which were intended to be used as bases for lamps. Id. at
213–14.
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dimensional objects.91 No federal trademark regime existed, and common law
unfair competition precedents, which were sparse at the time, offered no clear basis
for the protection of designs as trade dress.92 Lastly, utility patent law protected
industrial creations but not their visual aspects.93 Indeed, writing with the benefit of
hindsight, William Edgar Simonds averred that the classes of “intellectual
productions” divided neatly into three: “books, maps, charts, cuts, engravings,
prints, and musical compositions” (all protected by copyright at the time); “new
and useful arts, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter, and
improvements thereon” (protectable under the utility patent regime); and “a third
class to which no protection had been given, comprising . . . patterns, figures, or
pictures to be woven into, or printed or impressed upon textile fabrics, as carpets,
shawls[,] and dress goods.”94
Our research suggests that, prior to 1836, some entrepreneurs were attempting to
use the utility patent regime to obtain design protection sub rosa. From 1793 to
1836, the utility patent system did not subject patent applications to substantive
examination prior to grant,95 so patents could issue without ever having been
scrutinized for compliance with substantive patentability requirements—including
requirements for eligible subject matter. While stove makers were certainly using
the utility patent system to protect technological innovations embodied in their

91. In particular, Congress extended copyright protection to engravings and etchings in
1802. See Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171, 171 (extending copyright protection
to “who[ever] shall invent and design, engrave, etch or work, or from his own works and
inventions, shall cause to be designed and engraved, etched or worked, any historical or
other print or prints”).
92. See, e.g., 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 7:62 (4th ed. 2009) (identifying the 1917 crescent wrench decision, Crescent
Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299 (2d Cir. 1917), as the first true American
product design trade dress case).
93. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 319 [hereinafter Patent Act of 1793]
(providing that utility patent protection extended to “any new and useful art, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art,
machine, manufacture or composition of matter”). We have found no evidence of any
argument to extend this language to ornamental design, except for a somewhat cryptic
remark from the treatise writer Willard Phillips. Phillips claimed that the French Patent Law
of 1791 rejected protection for “mere ornaments” as not the proper subject for utility patents
and then asserted:
[T]his appears to be a very questionable position, for it would never be
contended in case of an invention of which a part was ornamental merely, that
this part might be infringed with impunity; and there appears to be no more
ground for yielding any more protection to ornamental parts in an original
invention, than in an improvement, or in a case where a part of the invention
was ornamental, than one which should be wholly confined to ornament.
WILLARD PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS 135 (1836).
94. WILLIAM EDGAR SIMONDS, THE LAW OF DESIGN PATENTS 183 (1874). According to
Simonds, design patent protection was intended for the benefit of this third, unprotected
class. Id. at 184. As we have suggested throughout this paper, the creation of the design
patent system was not quite so conceptually pure.
95. See EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS:
AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1798–1836, at 427 (1998).
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cast-iron stoves, at least one stove maker attempted to use the utility patent regime
to obtain the equivalent of design protection. Walter Hunt, one of the nineteenth
century’s most prolific inventors,96 developed a globe-shaped heating stove that
was said to permit radiated heat to be distributed equally in all directions.97 Hunt
filed a utility patent application that not only detailed the construction and
functional advantages of the globe-shaped stove body but also included a drawing
in which the stove’s body was adorned with depictions of the continents (below,
left).98

Hunt included three claims in the application, the first of which suggests that he
may have been asserting exclusive rights over both the functional and the visual
aspects of the stove:
I claim the style, general arrangement and fashion of the above
described Radiator or Globe Stove believing the peculiar advantages of
said arrangement in the generating and equal diffusion of heat
exclusively confined to the globe or spheroid form as a reservoir of
fuel . . . which cannot be effected by the regular or cylindrical stove.99
An early advertisement for the stove not only highlights its useful features but
also indicates that “[p]atterns may be seen at the [Globe Stove] office.”100 The
patent drawings depict additional ornamentation, likewise suggesting that the
Globe Stove was about more than merely functional advantages.101 Hunt’s example

96. See generally JOSEPH NATHAN KANE, NECESSITY’S CHILD: THE STORY OF WALTER
HUNT, AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN INVENTOR (1997). Hunt’s pioneering work on sewing
machines later figured prominently in massive patent litigation in that industry. See Adam
Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The Sewing Machine War
of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 187–90 (2011).
97. KANE, supra note 96, at 63.
98. Heating Stove, U.S. Patent No. 8,006X fig. 1 (issued Feb. 8, 1834) (Fig. 1, depicted
on the left). The drawing on the right is Figure 2 from the patent, a partial cutaway view
depicting the stove’s interior construction.
99. Id. at 84–85 (claim 1) (emphasis added); see also KANE, supra note 96, at 63.
100. KANE, supra note 96, at 61 (reprinting an advertising sheet dated Nov. 1833 for
“Hunt’s Patent Radiator, or Globe Stove”).
101. See ’006X Patent fig.1; see also The Globe Stove, N.Y. COM. ADVERTISER, Nov. 7,
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is particularly noteworthy because he eventually joined Mott in lobbying for design
protection legislation, as we discuss in more detail below.102
The appropriability problem that was developing in the cast-iron goods industry
was also plaguing the New England textile industry in America.103 Design piracy
became particularly widespread in the American textile industry in the 1830s.104
Ornate calico prints produced at the New England factories of Francis Lowell (and
fellow Boston Associates) had become so popular that they had “displace[d] the
linseys, checks, and homespun plaids” that local artisans had traditionally sold.105
As firms came to produce calico design patterns on an ever-expanding scale,
competitors inevitably sought to mimic those patterns.106 However, American
intellectual property law provided no apparent recourse.
Intellectual property scholars will find this narrative familiar. It is a classic
exemplar of the public goods problem of intellectual property lore.107 Predictions of
an intellectual property law response would fit amicably within Harold Demsetz’s
thesis for the emergence of private property rights.108 An intellectual property
response was predictable for another reason: an analogous situation had developed
in Great Britain.
B. Design Piracy in Great Britain and the Intellectual Property Law Response
As American manufacturers came to realize, a similar saga of technological
advance had spurred a legislative response in Great Britain. Cotton textile
manufacturers in northern England and Scotland had adopted technological

1833, at 2 (“[F]rom the beauty and perfection of some of the castings we have seen, it can be
made as ornamental as need be desired.”).
102. See infra Part III. Like Mott, Hunt manufactured stoves in New York City. See
KANE, supra note 96, at 66 (noting that Hunt identified himself in city directories as a stove
maker in New York City). Mott, in turn, was apparently familiar with Hunt’s work on the
globe-stove. See, e.g., Coal-Stove, U.S. Patent No. 4,247 (issued Nov. 1, 1845) (noting his
awareness of Hunt’s globe-stove).
103. Indeed, the problem fits a classic pattern; it has been duplicated in many settings and
has driven much intellectual property policy over the decades. See, e.g., ADRIAN JOHNS,
PIRACY (2009).
104. See PAUL E. RIVARD, A NEW ORDER OF THINGS: HOW THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY
TRANSFORMED NEW ENGLAND 68–69 (2002) (characterizing design copying as standard
practice).
105. CLARK, supra note 80, at 547.
106. Copying textile print patterns did require some skill. A would-be copyist had to be
capable of decoding the pattern’s elements, engraving them for rollers, and then determining
the proper blend of dyes. RIVARD, supra note 104, at 68–69.
107. Indeed, analogous problems in the British textile industry had generated design
legislation that took its cue from copyright law, and American lobbyists drew on the British
experience to formulate their proposals, as we discuss further infra Part III.
108. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347,
350 (1967) (positing that changes in technology or markets stimulate the creation and
capture of emerging economic value through private property rights). We do not mean to
suggest that the Demsetzian account provides a comprehensive explanation for the creation
of the design patent system. As we show infra Part III, a number of domestic political factors
also contributed to the enactment of the design patent provisions.
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innovations in printer cylinders that enabled them to print patterns over continuous
lengths of cloth, on a large scale, and at previously unheard-of rates.109 However,
these manufacturers quickly found that consumers preferred the patterns they
associated with London-based manufacturers,110 so they copied those patterns and
used them to produce calico prints in quantities far exceeding their originators.111
Not surprisingly, by the late 1700s, the London calico manufacturers were
complaining to Parliament.112 Because contemporary English copyright law
protected engravers and authors but not textile pattern makers,113 Parliament
enacted new legislation, the Calico Printers’ Act of 1787,114 which conferred
protection on persons “who shall invent, design, and print . . . any new and original
pattern . . . for printing linens, cottons, callicos, or muslins.”115 By the early 1800s,
an active debate in England about expanding the Act culminated in a radical new
design protection system beginning in 1839.116 We discuss its details below and
explain how it came to be used as a model for American law.
III. DESIGN PATENT LAW’S AMBIVALENT LEGISLATIVE ANCESTRY
In view of the technological context that we have explored in Part II, we now
turn to an analysis of the design patent system’s legislative ancestry. Relying on
newly uncovered source material, we describe the first proposal for American
design protection legislation, which was styled as copyright legislation and
borrowed heavily from British design copyright law. We then recount the
disappearance of the first proposal and the emergence of a second—newly

109. See, e.g., Lara Kriegel, Culture and the Copy: Calico, Capitalism, and Design
Copyright in Early Victorian Britain, 43 J. BRIT. STUD. 233, 238–39 (2004).
110. See id. at 239–40.
111. Id. at 240.
112. SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 62, at 63 n.3.
113. See Engraving Copyright Act, 1734, 8 Geo. 2, c. 13 (Eng.), amended by Engraving
Copyright Act, 1766, 7 Geo. 3, c. 38 (Eng.), amended by Prints Copyright Act, 1777, 17
Geo. 3, c. 57 (Eng.).
114. An Act for the Encouragement of the Arts of designing and printing Linens,
Cottons, Callicoes, and Muslins, by vesting the Properties thereof in the Designers, Printers,
and Proprietors, for a limited Time, 27 Geo. 3, c. 38 (1787) (Eng.) [hereinafter Calico
Printers’ Act].
115. Id. § 1. Protection endured only for two months, a reflection of the staunch
opposition that the northern cotton factories mounted. SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 62, at
63 n.3. Parliament initially enacted the Calico Printers’ Act for only one year, see Calico
Printers’ Act § 3, but extended it successively. See An Act for continuing an Act made in the
twenty-seventh Year of the Reign of his present Majesty, intituled [sic], An Act for the
Encouragement of the Arts of designing and printing Linens, Cottons, Callicoes, and
Muslins, by vesting the Properties thereof in the Designers, Printers, and Proprietors for a
limited Time, 29 Geo. 3, c. 19 (1789) (Eng.), made perpetual by An Act for amending and
making perpetual an Act made in the twenty-seventh Year of the Reign of his present
Majesty, intituled [sic], An Act for the Encouragement of the Arts of Designing and Printing
Linens, Cottons, Calicoes, and Muslins, by vesting the Properties thereof in the Designers,
Printers, and Proprietors, for a limited Time, 34 Geo. 3, c. 23 (1794) (Eng.).
116. See infra Part III.
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characterized as patent legislation. We show why this new proposal likely sprang
from considerations of bureaucratic self-interest, not from any perceived distinction
between the relative merits of copyright and patent protection for designs. We
conclude by showing that the ultimate passage of the design patent legislation
likely resulted from external political forces—specifically, a protectionist surge
advocated by the Whig Party and bitterly opposed by the Jacksonian Democrats.
A. The Mott and Ruggles Proposals: Design Patent’s Genesis in British Design
Copyright117
Stove manufacturer Jordan L. Mott set in motion the proposals that eventually
grew into the design patent legislation. In February 1841, Mott, on behalf of
himself and numerous signatories, petitioned Congress for design protection.118
Noting that designs were not eligible for utility patent protection, Mott’s petition
argued that “improvements . . . in articles of manufacture ha[d] rendered necessary
a registration of new designs and patterns.”119 These designs “require[d] a
considerable expenditure of time and money, and c[ould] be . . . use[d] . . . by any
person so disposed, in such a manner as to undersell the inventor or proprietor.”120
Above all, the petitioners did not call for copyright or patent protection but for a
registration.121

117. To our knowledge, scholars have never previously analyzed the Ruggles bill
discussed in this section. Ruggles’s introduction of both the petition on February 3, 1841,
and the bill on February 27, 1841, were misclassified in the Congressional Globe’s index
under the heading “Patent Office, report of the Commissioner, showing operations of, for the
past year,” see CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 2d Sess. index at 6 (1841), which may explain
why previous researchers have not uncovered it.
118. See JORDAN L. MOTT ET AL., PETITION OF A NUMBER OF MANUFACTURERS AND
MECHANICS OF THE UNITED STATES, PRAYING THE ADOPTION OF MEASURES TO SECURE TO
THEM THEIR RIGHTS IN PATTERNS AND DESIGNS, S. DOC. NO. 26-154 (2d Sess. 1841)
[hereinafter MANUFACTURERS’ PETITION]. It is not clear whether Jordan Mott was a Whig, or
whether he was otherwise in a position to harness Whig political forces to press his proposal
forward. We do know that Mott was not shy about lobbying prominent Whigs about
intellectual property matters. In an 1851 debate over utility patent legislation, Mott
corresponded with the nation’s most prominent Whig, Henry Clay, receiving a polite but
peremptory response. See Letter from Jordan L. Mott to Henry Clay (Jan. 24, 1851), in 10
THE PAPERS OF HENRY CLAY 848 (Melba Porter Hay ed., 1991). One year later, Mott was
chosen to serve as an aid in the grand procession in New York City in observance of Henry
Clay’s death, see Programme of Arrangements for the Funeral Ceremonies of the Late Hon.
Henry Clay, N.Y. DAILY TIMES, July 19, 1852, at 1, though we cannot say whether this
indicates Mott’s Whiggish tendencies or merely his substantial prominence in New York.
119. MANUFACTURERS’ PETITION, supra note 118, at 1 (emphasis added).
120. Id. (estimating that it only cost the copier “one-hundredth of the expense which it
has cost the original manufacturer”). Intellectual property scholars will recognize this as a
classic invocation of the public goods problem. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 19–20 (2003)
(providing a general discussion).
121. MANUFACTURERS’ PETITION, supra note 118, at 1.
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Moreover, after noting that fabric designers faced similar obstacles, the
petitioners were quick to point out that Great Britain had recently passed such
rights for their citizens.122 They argued:
Your petitioners believe that the manufacturers and mechanics of the
United States are not surpassed by those of any other country, in the
durability and utility of the articles manufactured by them; and they
confidently affirm that the articles manufactured by them would equal any
others in beauty, if new designs and patterns were secured by registration.123
Thus, design protection was cast not only as a problem of domestic free riding, but
also as an international trade problem.124
Although the copy of Mott’s petition reprinted in the U.S. Congressional Serial
Set125 includes only the text of the petition itself, additional archival research turned
up a reproduction of the original that included the petitioners’ signatures, including
that of Walter Hunt, the inventor of the Globe Stove.126 Some signatories also listed
their occupations. A study of these signatories provides a rare glimpse into the
grassroots politics of early American lobbying efforts in intellectual property. They
were all male (not surprisingly) and all from the Northeast: predominantly New
York and New Jersey, along with Connecticut, and the cities of Philadelphia and
Boston. A few appear to have been Whigs,127 but we are unable to determine
whether the petitioners originated predominantly from Whig party rolls. Most who
identified their occupation appear to have been tradesmen: a manufacturer, an
engineer, a “designer in mechanics,” three “mechanists,” and various others.128
It is perhaps significant that some of the listed professions involved subject
matter that lay at the margins of traditional copyright and patent regimes—and still

122. Id. (citing An Act to secure to Proprietors of Designs for Articles of Manufacture the
Copyright of such Designs for a limited Time, 2 Vict., c. 17 (1839) (Eng.) [hereinafter
Designs Registration Act, 1839]).
123. Id.
124. See supra Part II (discussing this aspect of design patent’s origins).
125. See MANUFACTURERS’ PETITION, supra note 118, at 2 (identifying signatories only
as “JORDAN L. MOTT and others”).
126. Our appreciation to Kenneth Kato, Center for Legislative Archives, National
Archives and Records Administration, for assistance in procuring the signature pages. Scans
of the signature pages are on file with authors.
127. For example, J.W. Warren of Boston appears to have been a newspaper editor and
Whig party member. See CHRISTIAN WATCHMAN, Mar. 3, 1837, § 18, at 9 (reporting on
Warren’s editorship of the Christian Witness); Public Meeting, N.Y. DAILY TIMES, Mar. 5,
1852, at 2 (listing Warren as a supporter of the Whig nomination of Daniel Webster for
President). Andrew Anderson of Jersey City likewise may have been involved in Whig
politics, at least as of the 1850s. See Jersey City: Whig Primary Meeting, N.Y. DAILY TIMES,
Apr. 6, 1854, at 3.
128. One signatory was Joseph Priestley—not the famous scientist credited with the
discovery of oxygen, who passed away in 1804, but perhaps an heir. For biographical
background on the famous Priestley, see STEVEN JOHNSON, THE INVENTION OF AIR (2008).
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does. For example, Isaac Edge, Jr., of Jersey City, was a renowned designer of
fireworks displays.129 Joseph E. Ebling of New York was a confectioner.130
Another signatory, Samuel Loomis of Connecticut, was probably from the
famed Loomis family of furniture designers.131 If so, this shows good foresight.
Design protection (including by design patent) has proven especially important for
furniture designers over the years.132 Yet another signatory appears to have been an
inventor of prosthetic limbs, which eventually obtained utility patent protection.133
Senator John Ruggles from Maine,134 former chair of the Senate’s Committee on
Patents and the Patent Office,135 presented Mott’s petition to Congress136 and,
within weeks, followed up with a legislative proposal.137 Ruggles was a logical
sponsor for the legislation given his reputation as a leader in Congress on
intellectual property matters, but he also may have had a family interest in the bill.
John Ruggles’s brother, Draper Ruggles,138 was a partner in the largest cast-iron
plow and agricultural implement company in the United States—Ruggles, Nourse
& Mason.139 In addition, the firm apparently had business connections with Mott,
acting as a distributor for Mott’s famous agricultural furnace.140

129. See Classified Advertisement, Edge’s First Premium Fireworks, N.Y. DAILY TIMES, June
29, 1854, at 5 (representative advertisement of the Edge family’s displays); Independence Day:
Celebration of the “Glorious Fourth,” N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1854, at 1 (reporting that the Edge
family had been hired by New York City for the July 4th fireworks celebration).
130. MANUFACTURERS’ PETITION, supra note 118 (signature page).
131. Loomis furniture is on display in the Wadsworth Atheneum Museum of Art as
examples of the Colchester/Norwich furniture style. See American Decorative, WADSWORTH
ATHENEUM MUSEUM ART, http://www.thewadsworth.org/american-decorative/.
132. For a recent example from the design patent area, see Amini Innovation Corp. v.
Anthony California, Inc., 439 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
133. William Selpho of New York. See Construction of Artificial Hands, U.S. Patent No.
18,021 (issued Aug. 18, 1857); Construction of Artificial Legs, U.S. Patent No. 14,836
(issued May 6, 1856).
134. For general biographical information on Ruggles, see 12 THE NATIONAL
CYCLOPÆDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 230 (1904). Regarding the family’s political
prominence, see FRANCES COWLES, THE FAMILY OF RUGGLES 8–9 (1912).
135. CONG. GLOBE, 25th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1837) (noting Ruggles’s position as
Committee chair).
136. See CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 2d Sess. 139 (1841). The petition was ordered for
printing and referred to the Committee on Patents and the Patent Office. Id.
137. For promoting the progress of the useful arts, by securing the right of invention and
copy-right to proprietors of new designs for manufactures, for limited times, S. 269, 26th
Cong. (1841) [hereinafter Ruggles Design Bill]; CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 2d Sess. 212
(1841) (reporting that Senator Ruggles “asked and obtained leave to introduce a bill granting
copy-rights to inventors of designs, &c., which was read twice and referred to the Committee
on Patents and the Patent Office”).
138. HENRY RUGGLES, ANCESTRY OF JUDGE THOMAS RUGGLES, OF COLUMBIA FALLS,
MAINE, AND JUDGE JOHN RUGGLES OF THOMASTON, MAINE 36–37 (1924) (Maine Historical
Society). We are especially indebted to Jamie Kingman Rice, public services librarian at the
Maine Historical Society, and Maribel Nash, reference librarian at the Pritzker Legal
Research Center at Northwestern School of Law, for this point.
139. See CHARLES G. WASHBURN, INDUSTRIAL WORCESTER 132–33 (1917). See generally
2 J. LEANDER BISHOP, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURES FROM 1608 TO 1860, at 701–
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The bill was styled as a design copyright proposal. It proposed a “sole and
exclusive copy-right” for the proprietor of any “new and original design”141 for
specified articles of manufacture.142 The list of specified articles explicitly
responded to the wishes of the iron and textile industries. It included “linen, cotton,
calico, muslin, or other textile fabric,”143 ornamentation on any article other than a
textile fabric,144 and the shape or configuration of any article not falling into the

02 (1864) (providing some background on the partnership and their successor Oliver Ames
& Sons’ Agricultural Implement Manufactory). Draper Ruggles also figured in an important
early utility patent infringement case. See Prouty v. Ruggles, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 336, 341
(1842) (espousing an all-elements rule for utility patent infringement). Draper Ruggles was
likely the unnamed “brother” continually referred to in the Select Committee’s investigation
into Senator John Ruggles’s activities with Henry C. Jones. See Hugh L. White, Senate
Select Committee Report, S. DOC. NO. 25-377, at 9, 12, 16, 17, 19, 56, 68 (1838). According
to the report, Ruggles allegedly sought to secure patent rights for a brother who lived in
Worcester, Massachusetts, and who already had a half interest in a patented plough. See id.
at 9. Although the exact plough is unknown, Draper Ruggles’s iron manufactory in
Worcester owned the patents to numerous ploughs and agricultural implements during this
time, and the report is probably referring to Ruggles’s ownership of Jethro Wood’s patented
plough. See WASHBURN, supra, at 132.
140. See Mott’s Agricultural Furnace, ME. FARMER, Jan. 8, 1846, at 1 (explaining that
Mott’s furnace could be purchased at the Ruggles, Nourse & Mason warehouse in Boston
and including a drawing of a 22 gallon model); Advertisement, Mott’s Agricultural Furnace,
ME. FARMER, Oct. 15, 1846, at 1.
141. Although these terms were eventually adopted by the legislature, and even
developed into the same novelty and originality standards that we think of today as
distinguishing patent and copyright law, it is not clear what Senator Ruggles meant by “new
and original.” See infra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing their contemporary
meanings under British law). Indeed, it took over a quarter of a century for this distinction to
develop in U.S. law, and their meanings under both regimes were in flux during this time.
See Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Revising the “Original” Patent Clause: Pseudohistory in
Constitutional Construction, 2 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 155, 181–209 (1989) (tracing the novelty
standard); Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 451, 469–82
(2009) (tracing the originality standard); see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879)
(distinguishing patent and copyright, in part, by novelty and one component of the modern
originality standard, independent creation). Although the requirements have different
meanings today, contemporary courts often used them interchangeably and across both
regimes—broadly requiring the combined elements of a copyrightable work or a patentable
invention to be produced by the author or inventor’s intensive labor or creativity. See Miller,
supra, at 469–75. Joseph Miller points out that “[t]he contemporary taboo against comparing
originality [in copyright] to nonobviousness[, invention, or novelty (in patent)] is just that—
contemporary.” Id. at 471. The modern design patent act’s retention of these terms (new and
original) stands as one of the few fossilized reminders of patent and copyright’s common
history.
142. Ruggles Design Bill, S. 269, 26th Cong. § 1 (1841).
143. Id. (offering protection “[f]or the pattern or print to be either worked, stamped,
printed, or painted, into or on any article of manufactured linen, cotton, calico, muslin, or
other textile fabric”).
144. Id. (offering protection “[f]or the modelling [sic], or the casting, or the embossment,
or the chasing, or engraving, or for any other kind of impression or ornament, on any article
of manufacture not being a textile fabric”).
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previously mentioned categories.145 The copyright term was one year,146 except
where the design was for ornamentation on an article “made of metal,” the term
was three years.147
Ruggles’s bill provided that the proposed design copyright would only come
into force upon registration.148 However, registration would be issued only if, “on
examination” by the Patent Office,149 the design appeared to be “new and
original,”150 assuming that the applicant also paid the requisite filing fee151 and
complied with other formalities.152 The registered rights-holder received a right to
institute an infringement action against anyone who “shall adopt and use” the
registered design during the term of the registration.153
Most of the concepts in Ruggles’s bill, and even many of the key passages, were
not original. They had been borrowed from Britain’s dual copyright system for
designs, enacted scarcely two years earlier.154 One component of the dual system,
the British Copyright of Designs Act (1839), extended copyright protection to new
and original155 patterns for printing “Linens, Cottons, Calicoes, or Muslins,”156—
the same list that later appeared in Ruggles’s proposal.157 The other component, the
Design Registrations Act (1839), protected three categories of subject matter: (1)
any “Pattern or Print, to be either worked into or worked on, or printed on or
painted on, any Article of Manufacture”; (2) designs “[f]or the Modeling, or the
Casting, or the Embossment, or the Chasing, or the Engraving, or for any other
Kind of Impression or Ornament, on any Article of Manufacture, not being a Tissue
or textile Fabric”; and lastly (3) “the Shape or Configuration of any Article of
Manufacture.”158 Ruggles borrowed this three-part structure and substituted the list
of fabrics into the first category, converting the British dual system into a unified

145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. § 4.
150. Id.; see also supra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing the “new and
original” requirement).
151. Ruggles Design Bill, S. 269, 26th Cong. § 6 (1841).
152. Id. § 4.
153. Id. § 3. Recovery for infringement ranged from $20 to $200 and was contingent on
marking. Id. Unfortunately, this innovation did not make its way into the 1842 Act. See Act
of Aug. 29, 1842, supra note 60. Because of the palpable difficulty of proving that a
defendant’s profits from an infringing product were attributable to the protected design—and
not other things like marketing or functionality—Congress eventually provided a minimum
recovery for willful infringement in 1887. See Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 105, § 1, 24 Stat. 387; see
also Frederic H. Betts, Some Questions Under the Design Patent Act of 1887, 1 YALE L.J. 181, 182–
83 (1892).
154. Designs Registration Act, 1839, 2 Vict., c. 17, § 1 (Eng.); An Act for Extending the
Copyright of Designs for Calico Printing to Designs for Printing other Woven Fabrics, 2
Vict., c. 13 (1839) (Eng.) [hereinafter Calico Act, 1839].
155. See infra note 164.
156. Calico Act, 1839, 2 Vict., c. 13, §§ 1, 3 (Eng.) (additionally extending protection to
“other Fabrics of a similar Nature,” which included fabrics composed of wool, silk, or hair,
and any mixture thereof).
157. Ruggles Design Bill, S. 269, 26th Cong. § 1 (1841).
158. Designs Registration Act, 1839, 2 Vict., c. 17, § 1 (Eng.).
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system of protection.159 The British Design Registrations Act (1839) also served as
Ruggles’s source for the requirement of registration,160 the duration (one to three
years, depending on the subject matter),161 the mandated range of damages,162 and
the exclusive right to use the design during its respective term of protection.163
However, both acts notably required the design to be “new and original”164—a
requirement that can be traced to embryonic British design protection from 1787.165
Thus, the earliest American design protection proposal was a direct descendant
of British copyright and design registration law.166 The one variation—and it is a

159. See Ruggles Design Bill, S. 269, 26th Cong. § 1 (1841) (providing the relevant
language of the Ruggles bill).
160. Designs Registration Act, 1839, 2 Vict., c. 17, §§ 1, 8 (Eng.). The British had settled
on a dual-component system because the British textile industry vehemently objected to a
requirement for registration, claiming (among other things) that manufacturers were already
printing identifying information on their textile products, rendering registration (and its
associated costs) unnecessary. SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 62, at 67–69. Accordingly,
the Copyright of Designs Act, applicable to textiles, called for no registration, in contrast to
the Designs Registration Act. Apparently, American textile manufacturers made no similar
plea to Ruggles.
161. Both the British legislation and Ruggles’s proposal protected castings, models,
chasings, and engravings made of metal or mixed metals for three years and all other designs
for only one year. Compare Designs Registration Act, 1839, 2 Vict., c. 17, § 1 (Eng.), with
Ruggles Design Bill, S. 269, 26th Cong. § 1 (1841).
162. Compare Designs Registration Act, 1839, 2 Vict., c. 17, § 3 (Eng.) (guaranteeing
£5.00 to £30.00 per offense), with Ruggles Design Bill, S. 269, 26th Cong. § 3 (1841)
(guaranteeing $20 to $200 per offense and potentially including costs of suit).
163. Compare Ruggles Design Bill, S. 269, 26th Cong. § 1 (1841) (granting “the sole and
exclusive copy-right to use” (emphasis added)), with Designs Registration Act, 1839, 2
Vict., c. 17, § 1 (Eng.) (granting the “sole Right to use”). However, both Ruggles’s bill and
the British Designs Registration Act arguably granted broader protection than the
corresponding British Calico Act for fabrics. See Calico Act, 1839, 2 Vict., c. 13, § 1 (Eng.)
(limiting protection to the “sole Right and Liberty of printing and re-printing”).
164. Unfortunately, their common origins shed little light on Ruggles’s bill. Although the
terms “new and original” can be found in numerous British copyright acts, similar to their
U.S. development, they were often loosely interpreted synonymously. See LEWIS EDMUNDS,
THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT IN DESIGNS 24 (1895) (noting that “[w]hether any distinction was
intended to be made between these terms does not seem clear”); MICHAEL FYSH, RUSSELLCLARKE ON COPYRIGHT IN INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS 36 (5th ed. 1974) (noting that even as of the
1970s, “[a]s to what distinction, if any, is to be drawn between the words new and original is
doubtful”). Yet contrary to the United States, as these terms began to take on distinct
meanings, contemporary British design acts were amended in a manner that reflected their
pseudo-copyright origins—requiring the design to be new or original. Patents and Designs
Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 29, § 49 (Eng.) [hereinafter Patent and Designs Act]; see also
EDMUNDS, supra, at 24 (pointing out that these terms should be construed without analogy to
patents).
165. Calico Printers’ Act, 1787, 27 Geo. 3, c. 38, § 1 (Eng.) (granting protection to
“every person who shall invent, design, and print, or cause to be invented, designed, and
printed, and become the proprietor of any new and original pattern or patterns for printing
linens, cottons, callicoes [sic], or muslins” (emphasis added)). See generally HENRY L.
ELLSWORTH, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS, H.R. DOC. NO. 27-74 (1842)
[hereinafter Ellsworth Report for 1841].
166. Ruggles may have been familiar with British copyright law as a result of his
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crucial one—is that Ruggles’s bill not only contemplated registration but also
required that applications for protection be subjected to pre-grant examination,
reminiscent of the procedures in place for American utility patents.167
The inclusion of an examination requirement was pure Ruggles. In his capacity
as chair of the Senate’s Select Committee on the affairs of the Patent Office,168
Ruggles had championed the idea of establishing a system of pre-grant, substantive
patent examination in the utility patent system. Under his guidance, the committee
had produced the 1836 Patent Act,169 still the most significant legislative reform in
the history of the American patent system largely due to its implementation of pregrant examination. It is no surprise that Ruggles, perhaps reflexively, would have
included an examination requirement in his design protection proposal.
Moreover, in the 1836 Patent Act, Ruggles also laid the administrative
foundation for a modern patent office that would carry out that pre-grant
examination.170 He was venerated, with considerable justification, as the “Father of
the Patent Office.”171 He had worked closely on the 1836 Patent Act with Henry
Ellsworth, the superintendent of the Patent Office who became the first
Commissioner of Patents under the new administrative structure that the 1836 act
provided,172 and Charles Keller, the model room keeper who became the first
examiner under the new act.173 Indeed, Ruggles had been, and remained, intimately
involvement in a debate over whether to extend U.S. copyright protection to British authors.
See S. 32, 25th Cong. (1838) (extending U.S. copyright protection to residents of the United
Kingdom, Ireland, and France upon print and publication in the U.S. simultaneously with its
foreign issue, or within one month of its requisite deposit in any U.S. district court); S. REP.
NO. 25-494, at 3–4 (1838) (report to accompany S. 32, recording Ruggles’s views). In any
event, few in Washington at the time could have claimed greater expertise with American
intellectual property laws than Ruggles.
167. Ruggles Design Bill, S. 269, 26th Cong. §§ 1, 4 (1841).
168. CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1835). He was joined on the committee by
Samuel Prentiss (Vermont) and Isaac Hill (New Hampshire). Id. The select committee was
an ad hoc patent law reform committee formed at Ruggles’s request. Ruggles had applied for
a patent under the then-existing 1793 act and had become sufficiently frustrated over the
act’s delays and other deficiencies that he made a speech on the Senate floor calling for
reform. The Father of the Patent Office, SCI. AM., May 9, 1891, at 295–96 (describing the
speech based on Ruggles’s notes).
169. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
170. See generally JOHN RUGGLES, REPORT WITH SENATE BILL NO. 239, S. REP. NO. 24338 (1836) [hereinafter 1836 Patent Act Report]. Indeed, Ruggles similarly played a unique
role laying the Patent Office’s physical foundation after its destruction. See JOHN RUGGLES,
REPORT WITH SENATE BILL NO. 107, S. REP. NO. 24-58 (1837).
171. The Father of the Patent Office, supra note 168, at 295.
172. We imagine that it is no coincidence that the first utility patent under the 1836 act
regime was issued to Ruggles. Locomotive Steam-Engine for Rail and Other Roads, U.S.
Patent No. 1 (issued July 13, 1836).
173. Charles Keller was appointed to the first examiner’s role under the new act at the
request of both Ellsworth and Ruggles and also served as the Patent Office’s model room
keeper. See Thaddeus Hyatt, Charles M. Keller and the American Patent Office, SCI. AM.,
May 21, 1859, at 310. While many commentators credit Ruggles and Ellsworth as the
originators of the 1836 Patent Act, the two likely received a considerable amount of input
from Keller. Id. Keller inherited the position from his father and had been advising patent
applicants informally since Superintendent Pickett’s administration. Id. Not only was
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involved with the Patent Office.174 When he left the Senate shortly after presenting
Mott’s petition and the proposed legislation, Ruggles was angling for an
appointment as the next Commissioner of Patents.175 The requirement for
examination, which surely could best be carried out at the Patent Office, reflected
Ruggles’s past alliances and served his future aspirations.
Ruggles’s proposed bill passed the Committee on Patents without
amendment.176 The committee’s chairman and Ruggles’s longtime colleague,177
Senator Samuel Prentiss, reported it on March 3, 1841. Unfortunately for Ruggles,
this was the last day of the congressional session. Likely a victim of its timing, the
bill was tabled and ordered to be printed.178 More importantly, because Ruggles had
failed to win his reelection campaign two years earlier, this was also his last session
in the Senate.179

Ellsworth’s letter to the Secretary of State (John Forsyth) full of recommendations from
Keller, but Ruggles also worked directly with Keller while drafting the bill. See id.;
KENNETH W. DOBYNS, THE PATENT OFFICE PONY 99 (1997); Robert C. Post, “Liberalizers”
Versus “Scientific Men” in the Antebellum Patent Office, 17 TECH. & CULTURE 24, 27
(1976); see also Letter from Henry Ellsworth, Superintendent of the Patent Office, to John
Forsyth, Sec’y of State (Jan. 29, 1836) reprinted in 8 MECHANIC’S MAG. no. 4, Oct. 1836 at
175–82 (response to Senator Ruggles’s questions from the select committee). Regardless of
Keller or Ellsworth’s impact on the act, Senator Ruggles is universally recognized as its
tireless political sponsor.
174. Ruggles was even credited with being the first person on the scene attempting to
save the Patent Office building when it caught fire in 1836. JOHN RUGGLES, REPORT WITH
SENATE BILL NO. 107, S. REP. NO. 24-58 (1837) (providing a very detailed account of the
destruction at the Patent Office); DOBYNS, supra note 173, at 107. If anything, Ruggles’s
involvement with the Patent Office may have been a bit too intimate. See HUGH L. WHITE,
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, S. REP. NO. 25-377 (1838) (investigating whether
Ruggles used undue influence to procure a reissued patent, explaining that Ruggles
frequented the Patent Office and had close connections with Charles Keller, and hinting that
he may have occasionally accessed the office’s secret archives where caveats were held).
175. Letter from John Ruggles, U.S. Senator, to Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec’y of State
(Apr. 24, 1841) (on file with Robert D. Farber University Archives & Special Collections
Department, Brandeis University) (containing Ruggles’s rather lavish recitation of his
qualifications for the position, including, among other things, that “[i]n reconstructing a code
of [American] patent law, I introduced new principles of acknowledged usefulness &
importance; which have since been adopted in England”). We are indebted to Sarah
Shoemaker, special collections librarian at Brandeis University, and Maribel Nash, reference
librarian at the Pritzker Legal Research Center at Northwestern School of Law, for helping
us unearth the letter. Ruggles procured several letters of recommendation and no doubt was
surprised when the position went to Henry Ellsworth instead. Id. (containing the letters of
recommendation).
176. CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 2d Sess. 226 (1841).
177. Senator John Ruggles and Senator Samuel Prentiss served together intermittently
since the first select committee was formed in 1835 to reform the existing patent registration
system. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 25th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1837); CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong.,
1st Sess. 64 (1835).
178. CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 2d Sess. 226 (1841) (noting that Ruggles’s bill “was laid
on the table and ordered to be printed”).
179. Ruggles’s departure from the Jacksonian Democrats likely played a key role in his
failed reelection bid. See Maine Senator, THE PITTSFIELD SUN, Feb. 4, 1841, at 3 (citing
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B. 1842 Ellsworth Report and Proposed Legislation: The Emergence of
Quasi-Patent Concepts
Mott’s lobbying efforts, however, continued into 1842. His petition was
presented again in the Senate in March 1842,180 and Ruggles’s former colleague
Senator Prentiss introduced legislation in April 1842.181 The 1842 legislation,
however, still bore indications of Ruggles’s original conception of a design
copyright regime with substantive pre-grant examination. Yet, it also had become
infused with more patent law rhetoric, undoubtedly as a result of suggestions made
by the man who had been granted the appointment that Ruggles so assiduously
sought—Patent Commissioner Henry Ellsworth.
In his annual Commissioner’s Report to Congress for the year 1841,182
published and referred to the Senate Committee on Patent and the Patent Office on
March 8, 1842,183 Ellsworth included three paragraphs recommending the
protection “of new and original designs for articles of manufacture, both in the fine
and useful arts.”184 After pointing out that other nations had granted such
protection,185 Ellsworth reiterated the rationale for protection that had been offered
in Mott’s petition:

BOSTON POST). While Ruggles was elected to the senate as a Jacksonian Democrat, he split
ways with his party on several key issues. See LOUIS CLINTON HATCH, MAINE: A HISTORY
(1919) 218 (noting that “[h]e served but one term as Senator, broke from his party on the
sub-treasury question, and was retired from political life”); David J. Russo, The Major
Political Issues of the Jacksonian Period and the Development of Party Loyalty in Congress,
1830-1840, 62 TRANSACTIONS AM. PHIL. SOC’Y, no. 5, at 3, 18, 41, 46 (1972) (describing
Ruggles as a renegade Democrat and noting his departure from the party on the issues of
slavery and the sub-treasury). By 1840, both Whigs and Conservatives were claiming
Ruggles as a loyalist. See A POLITICAL REGISTER FOR 1840 4 (1840) (Whig); United States
Senator, CHRISTIAN SECRETARY, Aug. 21, 1840, at 2 (Conservative); Harrison or Whigs,
NEW WORLD, Jan. 23, 1841, at 61 (Harrison or Whigs); Senator Ruggles, JEFFERSONIAN
REPUBLICAN, May 16, 1840, at 2 (noting that Ruggles “now goes for [Whig President]
Harrison and reform”). In the end, however, it appears that he ultimately sided with the
Conservatives and might have earned the moniker “Benedict Arnold” in return. Maine
Senator, supra, at 3 (stating, “Ruggles must know that the English never respected or trusted
Arnold much, after his treason, and now, in their retirement, they may have leisure to make
some reflections upon that fact”).
180. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 272 (1842) (petition presented in March 1842
by Senator Daniel Sturgeon (Pennsylvania) from the Committee on Patents).
181. S. 220, 27th Cong. (1842).
182. Ellsworth Report for 1841, H.R. DOC. NO. 27-74 (1842). Hudson claims that the
report is dated February 8, 1841, Hudson, supra note 58, at 380, but this appears to be an
error—Ellsworth’s annual report covered Patent Office operations in 1841 and therefore
would not have been circulated until sometime in 1842. See Ellsworth Report for 1841, S.
REP. NO. 27-169, at 1 (dated January 1842 by Ellsworth, referred for printing on February 7,
1842, and later referred to the Patent Committee on March 8, 1842).
183. See Ellsworth Report for 1841, S. REP. NO. 27-169, at 1.
184. Id. at 2.
185. Id. (asserting that “[o]ther nations have granted this privilege, and it has afforded
mutual satisfaction alike to the public and to individual applicants”).
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Competition among manufacturers for the latest patterns prompts to the
highest effort to secure improvements, and calls out the inventive
genius of our citizens. Such patterns are immediately pirated, at home
and abroad. A patent [sic, pattern] introduced at Lowell,186 for instance,
with however great labor or cost, may be taken to England in 12 or 14
days, and copied and returned in 20 days more.187
To address this situation, Ellsworth asserted, legal protection should be extended to
“new and original designs for a manufacture of metal or other material, or any new
and useful design for the printing of woollen, silk, cotton, or other fabric,”188 an
adaptation of Ruggles’s and Mott’s language and a nod to the lobbying influence of
the iron and textile industries. Ellsworth also suggested that protection be available
for “a bust, statue, or bas-relief, or composition in alto or basso-relievo.”189 But this
was not language from Ruggles’s proposal, it was copyright language—
specifically, language from British copyright law.190
However, the copyright language notwithstanding, Patent Commissioner
Ellsworth made clear that he was not styling his proposal as a copyright proposal.
Instead, he posited that the proposed protection “could be effected by simply
authorizing the Commissioner to issue patents for these objects, under the same
limitations and on the same conditions as govern present action in other cases.”191
The patent term could be seven years (half of the fourteen-year duration for utility
patents),192 and the application fee correspondingly could be half that charged for
utility patent applications.193
From a modern vantage point, Ellsworth’s allusion to patents may seem to be a
dramatic shift away from Ruggles’s copyright proposal. However, differences
between the substantive rules in the respective regimes were slight at the time of
Ellsworth’s report. Even the respective terms of patent and copyright had been
comparable until only a few years prior.194

186. See generally RIVARD, supra note 104, at 59–65 (discussing the importance of
Lowell, MA, to the textile industry).
187. Ellsworth Report for 1841, H.R. DOC. NO. 27-74, at 2.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. An Act for Encouraging the Art of Making New Models and Casts of Busts, 1798,
38 Geo. 3, c. 71, § 1 (Eng.) (protecting any “new Model, Copy, or Cast, or any such new
Model, Copy or Cast in Alto or Basso Relievo” of human or animal figures). Analogous
protection for three-dimensional objects in U.S. copyright law did not come into effect until
1870. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (specifically including “any book, map,
chart, dramatic or musical composition, engraving, cut, print, or photograph or negative
thereof, or of a painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statuary, and of models or designs
intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts” (emphasis added)).
191. Ellsworth Report for 1841, H.R. DOC. NO. 27-74, at 2.
192. Contra Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 18, 5 Stat. 117, 124–25 (1836) (extending
protection for another seven years, beyond the initial fourteen years, where the patentee
failed to obtain reasonable remuneration through no fault of their own).
193. Ellsworth Report for 1841, H.R. DOC. NO. 27-74, at 2.
194. Until 1831, both initial terms were fourteen years; however, by renewal authors
could double their copyright term. Compare Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124,

866

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:837

Moreover, other evidence suggests that Ellsworth’s nonchalant reference to
patents was motivated more by pragmatic political considerations than any
perception that patent rules were preferable to copyright rules for protecting
designs.195 Under Ellsworth’s proposal, fees of fifteen dollars for design protection
would be paid into the Patent Office.196 By contrast, antebellum copyright
protection involved a mere fifty-cent fee, payable to the federal court in the district
where the applicant resided and collected when the author deposited a copy of the
work with the court before publication, prepublication deposit being a prerequisite
of copyright protection at the time.197
Against the backdrop of a recessionary economy,198 not to mention construction
costs for a newly completed Patent Office building that ran four times higher than
its appropriation,199 a new revenue stream for the Patent Office would have been
especially attractive. The Congressional Globe’s notation regarding floor
commentary on the proposed legislation highlights the bill’s revenue effects,
reporting that the bill’s sponsor (Kerr) “explained, at great length, that the bill was
intended to apply the rights of patents to new objects, and thereby bring additional
revenue into the patent department, and to protect rights of patentees.”200 Indeed,
Senator Kerr would have been especially attuned to these revenue issues—he had
previously chaired the Committee on Public Buildings,201 which had oversight
responsibility for the Patent Office rebuilding project and, as current chairman of

124 (1790), with Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318–21 (1793).
195. Likewise, pragmatic considerations apparently motivated design protection
proponents in Britain to avoid placing British design protection under the auspices of the
patent system. The bureaucracy of the British patent system was notoriously byzantine, and
it was considered undesirable to subject design protection to those idiosyncrasies. SHERMAN
& BENTLY, supra note 62, at 81–83.
196. Ellsworth’s proposal suggested charging “one half of the present fee charged to
citizens and foreigners, respectively.” Ellsworth Report for 1841, H.R. DOC. NO. 27-74, at 2
(emphasis in original). Per contemporary utility patent fees (minimum $30), a granted design
patent cost American citizens $15. See U.S. PATENT OFFICE, INFORMATION TO PERSONS HAVING
BUSINESS TO TRANSACT AT THE PATENT OFFICE 7 (1836), reprinted in RULES OF PRACTICE: U.S.
PATENT OFFICE (1899) (compilation held by Cornell University Library). Because of the 1836 Patent
Act’s discriminatory pricing, it would have been much more expensive for foreigners—$500 for the
British and $300 for everybody else. Id.
197. See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 4, 4 Stat. 436, 437.
198. See supra Part II.
199. SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN REFERENCE BOOK 247 (Albert A. Hopkins & A. Russell Bond
eds., 1905) (noting that Congress had appropriated about $100,000 for the construction in
1836 and that the building, completed in 1840, had cost over $400,000); see also S. 296,
24th Cong. (1836) (pertinent legislation proposed by John Ruggles).
200. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess., at 833 (1842) (remarks of Senator Kerr). See
infra note 226 (explaining Kerr’s involvement). Of course, Ellsworth might have been able
to achieve these revenue goals irrespective of the form of protection he proposed by
providing that fees would be paid to the Patent Office even if the protection were more akin
to copyright. For example, Ruggles’s proposal would have given the Patent Office authority
over the proposed design copyright system, and applicants would have paid $10 in
application fees. Ruggles Design Bill, S. 269, 26th Cong. § 6 (1841).
201. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1842).
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the Patent Committee,202 he had just two days prior to this commentary reported a
bill proposing to expand the new Patent Office building.203
In addition, it is no surprise that Ellsworth, as Commissioner of Patents, would
make a proposal to expand his own department’s jurisdiction nor that he would do
so in the context of his annual report.204 And Ellsworth would have reasonably
expected enormous deference from Congress.205 The Senate committee on patents
frequently solicited Ellsworth’s recommendations206 and frequently acted on them.
The two pieces of patent legislation that passed between 1836 (when Ellsworth
became Commissioner) and 1845 (when Ellsworth left the post) can be traced to
recommendations he made in his annual reports.207 These reports had a wide
audience around the country, albeit probably for the agricultural statistics included
in the report rather than the patent policy matters.208
One commentator, Thomas B. Hudson, has offered additional reasons
purporting to explain why design protection was effectuated by patent rather than

202. S. Journal, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 399 (1842).
203. S. 290, 27th Cong. § 1 (1842); S. Journal, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 524 (1842).
204. By 1839, Ellsworth had already successfully lobbied for the expansion of the
Commissioner’s evidentiary powers and pushed the Patent Office into the business of
collecting agricultural statistics. Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 88, §§ 9, 12, 5 Stat. 353, 354–55.
Before leaving the Commissioner’s role in 1845, Ellsworth even managed to help Samuel
Morse obtain a large appropriation for further experimentation on the telegraph. HARRY
KURSH, INSIDE THE U.S. PATENT OFFICE 26 (1959).
205. Ellsworth came from a family of great prominence in early American society. His
father had been a Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, and his twin brother was a
formidable judge and politician. See William I. Wyman, Henry L. Ellsworth, The First
Commissioner of Patents, 1 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 524, 524 (1919). But Ellsworth did not
simply rest on his family’s reputation. By the time that President Jackson made him
Commissioner at the age of forty-five, he had already been a mayor in Connecticut
(Hartford), run a large insurance company (Aetna), and even helped Jackson as one of his
chief commissioners of Indian Affairs (overseeing the vast displacement of Native
Americans in what many historians refer to as the “Trail of Tears”). See KURSH, supra note
204, at 26.
206. See, e.g., Letter from Henry Ellsworth, U.S. Comm’r of Patents, to John Ruggles,
U.S. Senator (Feb. 23, 1838), reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 25-797, at 3–5 (1838) (responding
to Ruggles’s inquiry into whether further legislation was necessary for business at the Patent
Office).
207. The design patent legislation was part of a larger 1842 Patent Act, and in that bill,
five of the six sections were proposed in Ellsworth’s report. Compare HENRY L. ELLSWORTH,
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS, H.R. DOC. NO. 27-74, at 2 (1842), with Act of
Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, §§ 1, 3–6, 5 Stat. 543, 543–45. Likewise, eleven of the thirteen sections of
the 1839 act derive from one of Ellsworth’s annual reports. Compare Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 88,
5 Stat. 353, with HENRY L. ELLSWORTH, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS, H.R. DOC.
NO. 25-80, at 2–4 (1839), and HENRY L. ELLSWORTH, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS,
S. DOC. NO. 25-105, at 2–6 (1838).
208. RICHARD R. JOHN, NETWORK NATION: INVENTING AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
47 (2010) (arguing that the agricultural statistics ultimately drove the popularity of
Ellsworth’s annual reports); The Commissioner of Patents, OHIO CULTIVATOR, May 1, 1845,
at 9 (lauding the importance of Ellsworth’s annual reports and noting that it “makes a
volume of greater interest than any other volume published periodically, in this country”).
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copyright, but these, too, strike us as unpersuasive. Hudson postulated that
manufactured articles were closer to the subject matter of patents than the
“intellectual products” of copyright law (e.g., books, maps, etc.).209 But this
explanation is incomplete; Ellsworth’s proposal (and the design patent legislation
as ultimately enacted) covered works of fine art (statues, for example), in addition
to traditionally manufactured goods.210 Hudson also speculates that the copyright
system lacked a central depository at the time, unlike the patent system.211
However, design legislation could have provided for a centralized depository at the
Patent Office even if design protection took on the form of copyright protection.
Indeed, the Patent Office had long been used as a repository of various copyrighted
works during its tenure,212 and this is essentially what Ruggles’s proposal had
done.213
In sum, the proposals that ultimately resulted in the first American design patent
statute veered from a quasi-copyright proposal to a patent proposal for extrinsic
reasons. Our research uncovered no evidence of any debate over the wisdom of the
core idea that substantive utility patent law rules should govern a new design
protection regime and no indication that drafters of the design patent statute were
sufficiently prescient to foresee that copyright and utility patent jurisprudence
would evolve along divergent paths in the decades to come.
Our historical analysis also demonstrates that claims that the design patent
system originated as an historical accident are misleading. Design protection
legislation came about in large part because Jordan Mott persisted in his lobbying
efforts. And Ellsworth’s adept maneuvering of the design protection scheme onto
the Patent Office’s turf was no accident.
On the other hand, the final chapter in the legislative odyssey of the 1842 design
patent provisions does provide some support for the historical accident thesis. The
design patent provisions passed during a political firestorm. The political forces
that appear to have converged to make the design patent provisions a reality were
transient and anomalous. We analyze these peculiar political circumstances below.

209. Hudson, supra note 58, at 383.
210. Ellsworth Report for 1841, H.R. DOC. NO. 27-74 (1842), at 2.
211. Hudson, supra note 58, at 383.
212. Pamphlet from William Thornton, U.S. Superintendent of the Patent Office (Mar. 5,
1811), reprinted in AM. FARMER, Jan. 27, 1826, at 357–58 (explaining the process of
acquiring a patent or copyright and noting that specimens of copyrighted works, like paper
hangings and ornaments for rooms, could be deposited directly with the Patent Office or the
Secretary of State in order to fulfill the deposit requirement). See generally R. Anthony Reese,
Innocent Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law: A History, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 133, 137 (2007)
(describing copyright protection formalities from 1790 to 1909); John Y. Cole, Ainsworth Spofford
and the Copyright Law of 1870, in A CENTURY OF COPYRIGHT IN THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 3 (1970)
(noting that storing the copies of these works was a point of frustration for numerous patent
commissioners, since space was such a premium at the Patent Office).
213. See supra Part III.A.
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C. Passage of the 1842 Act: Design Patent Protection and the Protectionist Surge
The Twenty-Seventh Congress received Commissioner Henry Ellsworth’s report
recommending design patent protection in March, and in April 1842 Senator
Samuel Prentiss, a Whig from Vermont, introduced legislation.214 It had no chance
of progressing through the legislative process for a simple reason: the TwentySeventh Congress was utterly in deadlock.
The crisis in Congress in the spring of 1842 had its roots in a long-running feud
between the Jacksonian Democrats and their emergent rivals, the American Whigs.
Just over a year earlier, the Whig Party had gained a majority of seats in Congress
and had finally captured the White House. The Whigs had won on a platform
favoring aggressive protectionist tariffs,215 arguing successfully that the free trade
policies of the Jacksonian Democrats had triggered the Panic of 1837, a severe
economic recession whose effects extended into the 1840s.216 In early 1841, it
appeared certain that the Whig legislative agenda, including the tariff legislation,
would swiftly be enacted.217
Then, after only a month in office, President William Henry Harrison died. His
successor, John Tyler of Virginia, was nominally a Whig but refused to cooperate

214. S. 220, 27th Cong. (1842). We do not mean to suggest that the design patent system
was purely the product of Whig partisanship. For example, both Ruggles and Ellsworth were
(at one point) Jacksonian Democrats. FRANKLIN BOWDITCH DEXTER, 6 BIOGRAPHICAL
SKETCHES OF THE GRADUATES OF YALE COLLEGE WITH ANNALS OF THE COLLEGE HISTORY
309–12 (1912) (offering brief biographical information); supra note 179.
215. The Whigs had been arguing for many years that “free trade was always linked with
depression, while protection brought prosperity.” Samuel Rezneck, The Social History of an
American Depression 1837–1843, 40 AM. HIST. REV. 662, 670 (1935). Nevertheless, the
Jacksonians maintained a policy of trade liberalization during their time in power, including
much of the 1830s. Scott C. James & David A. Lake, The Second Face of Hegemony:
Britain’s Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846, 43 INT’L ORG. 1,
9 (1989) (identifying four periods of antebellum tariff policy: increased protectionism from
1824–33; trade liberalization from 1833–42; a “brief but decided return to protection” from
1842–46; and the “political triumph of free trade principles” from 1846–61).
216. For background on the recession, see, e.g., Edward J. Balleisen, Vulture Capitalism
in Antebellum America: The 1841 Federal Bankruptcy Act and the Exploitation of Financial
Distress, 70 BUS. HIST. REV. 473, 479 (1996) (referring to two discrete economic downturns
during this period, the Panic of 1837 and the Panic of 1839); PETER TEMIN, THE JACKSONIAN
ECONOMY 148–55 (1969) (analyzing the causes of both crises). The Whigs succeeded—
albeit temporarily—in blaming the recession in part on Jacksonian banking policies, which
were unpopular in the West, and on British trade practices, which had caused cotton prices to
plummet and had generated resentment in the South. See Rezneck, supra note 215, at 669;
The Protective Policy, S. LITERARY MESSENGER, Apr. 1842, at 4 (offering an Anglophobic
polemic for high tariffs). Whatever the cause, the consequences were severe: banks failed
and early stock markets crashed, Peter L. Rousseau, Jacksonian Monetary Policy, Specie
Flows, and the Panic of 1837, 62 J. ECON. HIST. 457, 457 (2002), and the U.S. Treasury was
nearly bankrupted. 1 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
150 (2002).
217. MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY 69, 121
(1999).
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with Whig legislative initiatives,218 particularly the tariffs, which had long been
unpopular in the South.219 Incensed, the Whig congressional leadership dismissed
Tyler from the party and settled in for a monumental power struggle with the
administration, “contemptuously” dismissing Tyler’s legislative proposals and
bringing Washington to the verge of paralysis.220
For a time, Tyler refused to capitulate. The Whigs passed a legislative package
that included tariff legislation; Tyler immediately vetoed it.221 However, Tyler’s
position was unsustainable. The tariffs were a major source of federal government
revenue, and the tariff deadlock had the potential to shut down the government.222
Meanwhile, sectional differences were threatening to unravel the Whigs’ fragile
political coalition, and there were already signs that the electorate was growing
impatient with Whig promises to pull the nation out of the recession.223
By August 1842, the sheer enormity of the threat to the government’s fiscal
stability convinced Tyler that he had no choice but to support a tariff program. For
their part, the Whigs began to split up their legislative package, uncoupling the
tariff proposal from another controversial proposal relating to the distribution of
land revenues. While the disappearance of the land bill caused southern Whigs to
withdraw support, the Whig tariff was sufficiently popular in depressed northern
manufacturing areas that the Whigs were able to cobble together a flimsy coalition
with some northern Democrats (for example, Pennsylvania Democrats whose
constituents operated iron foundries, among others). On August 30, 1842, Congress
passed the Whig tariff legislation, characterized by one historian as the Whigs’ sole
legislative triumph of the session.224

218. For a concise recitation of events leading to Tyler’s rupture with Clay and the Whig
program, see SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 523–29 (2005).
219. Jacksonian Democrats had traditionally resisted high tariff rates on the ground that
the tariffs harmed southern agrarian interests. Southern resistance to proposed tariffs in the
early 1830s had precipitated the Nullification Crisis, in which South Carolina threatened to
secede if the tariffs were not adjusted. See Adrienne Caughfield, Tariff of 1828 (Tariff of
Abominations), in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TARIFFS AND TRADE IN U.S. HISTORY 363, 363–64
(Cynthia Clark Northrup & Elaine C. Prange Turney eds., 2003); Robert Tinkler, Tariff of
1832, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TARIFFS AND TRADE IN U.S. HISTORY, supra, at 365; see also
Douglas A. Irwin, Antebellum Tariff Politics: Regional Coalitions and Shifting Regional
Interests, 51 J.L. & ECON. 715, 730 (2008) (discussing the impact of the Tariff of 1832 on
the South). The 1833 Compromise Tariff Act provided a tariff regime that was only slightly
more favorable to the South. See TAUSSIG, supra note 79, at 110. For a concise discussion of
the Nullification Crisis, see DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT 395–410
(2007).
220. HOLT, supra note 217, at 137, 140.
221. Id. at 147.
222. See id. at 146–47. Adding further to the urgency of the situation, tariff reductions
promulgated several years earlier during the Jackson administration were scheduled to come
into effect in 1842. Id.
223. Id. at 140. Indeed, the Whigs fared so badly in state elections in the fall of 1841 that
by December 1841, prominent Senator John Calhoun (South Carolina) chortled that “I now
regard the Whigs as destroyed.” Id.
224. See id. at 148.
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In fact, there had been one other. The design patent legislation had lain dormant
through the summer,225 but Mott’s petition returned to the Senate again in early
August,226 courtesy of Prentiss’s replacement as chair of the Patent Committee,
Whig Senator John L. Kerr from Maryland.227 Senator Kerr also moved for the
Senate to take up the Prentiss bill for consideration.228 After two days of debate,229
the Senate passed the bill and reported it to the House,230 where it passed without
discussion231 the day before the passage of the tariff bill.
Although the historical evidence is largely circumstantial, we think it likely that,
but for the momentum of the great tariff debate, the design patent legislation would
have been shunted aside, another casualty of the partisan stalemate. It was the tariff
debate that brought together northern industrial interests, and these happened to be
the very same constituencies that stood to benefit most immediately from design
patent legislation.232 Senator Kerr, who had moved the Senate to consider Prentiss’s
design bill on August 3, 1842,233 had also presented a petition a few months earlier
from numerous manufacturers seeking increased iron tariffs.234

225. In addition to the obstacles that resulted from the Whigs’ fight with the Tyler
administration, Senator Prentiss had resigned from the Senate a few days after introducing
the design patent legislation in the spring. See CHARLES J.F. BINNEY, MEMOIRS OF JUDGE
SAMUEL PRENTISS OF MONTPELIER, VT., AND HIS WIFE LUCRETIA (HOUGHTON) PRENTISS 12
(1883), available at http://archive.org/details/memoirsofjudgesa00binn.
226. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 826 (1842) (petition presented in August 1842).
Kerr’s reintroduction of the petition was likely done for symbolic reasons (since it had been
five months since Sturgeon’s presentation to the same congressional session and he would
ask Congress to take up consideration of Prentiss’s bill the following day) or because of
changes in the Senate’s petition rules that also took place during this session. See Daniel
Wirls, “The Only Mode of Avoiding Everlasting Debate”: The Overlooked Senate Gag Rule
for Antislavery Petitions, 27 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 115, 128–29 (2007) (discussing the Senate’s
evolving gag rules during this era that were intended to deal with the onslaught of
antislavery petitions during this time). See generally Stephen A. Higginson, A Short History
of the Right to Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 156–
58 (1986) (discussing the typical Congressional reception and consideration of petitions via
committees during this gag rule era).
227. After Samuel Prentiss’s abrupt retirement from the Senate, Kerr was appointed chair
of the Senate’s Patent Committee in June 1842. S. JOURNAL, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 399
(1842).
228. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 832–33 (1842).
229. Our research suggests that a provision imposing a citizenship requirement, and
another relating to renewals for utility patents, were the only provisions debated. See infra
note 243–44.
230. See CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 911–12 (1842).
231. Id. at 960.
232. The sentiment for protectionism dissipated almost as quickly as it arose. By 1844,
the Democrats regained the White House, and President Polk immediately attacked the Whig
tariff regime. See Robert P. Sutton, Tariff of 1846 (Walker’s Tariff), in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
TARIFFS AND TRADE IN U.S. HISTORY, supra note 219, at 368–69; see also ROBERT W.
MERRY, A COUNTRY OF VAST DESIGNS 205–07 (2009) (recounting Polk’s first annual
message to Congress).
233. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 832–33 (1842). Prentiss had resigned from the
Senate a few days after introducing the design legislation. Senator Kerr had been appointed
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The political circumstances also suggest that it would have been expedient to
characterize the design patent legislation itself as a protectionist measure.235 There
was some precedent for this characterization in existing elements of antebellum
American intellectual property law.236 For example, U.S. copyright protection at the
time extended only to authors who were U.S. citizens,237 and the 1790 Copyright
Act expressly stated that the copying of foreign works was not forbidden.238 The
patent system likewise had included some discriminatory provisions—citizenship
restrictions between 1793 and 1836239 and discriminatory fees,240 working
requirements,241 and prior art provisions afterwards.242
chair of the Senate’s patent committee on June 15, 1842. S. JOURNAL, 27th Cong., 2d Sess.
399 (1842).
234. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 381 (1842) (presenting a “memorial from
citizens of Maryland, asking that the tariff of duties on imported iron might be restored to
what it was in 1839, with a view to protection: [which was] referred to the Committee on
Manufactures” on April 1, 1842).
235. We use the term “protectionism” here in its nineteenth century sense: advocates of
“protectionism” sought to use domestic legal regimes, including domestic intellectual
property laws, to insulate domestic producers from foreign competition, while “free trade”
adherents tended to lash out at the propagation and expansion of intellectual property
regimes. Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899, 941–48 (2002)
(citing free trade principles as the main ideological influence underlying a movement in
England in the 1860s to abolish patent protection). The modern dialectic of intellectual
property and protectionism is just the opposite: countries that recognize and enforce
intellectual property rights regimes at or above TRIPS-mandated minimums are frequently
said to be acting in accord with free trade principles, while countries that derogate from
those minimums engage in “protectionism.” See, e.g., Yiqiang Li, Evaluation of the SinoAmerican Intellectual Property Agreements: A Judicial Approach to Solving the Local
Protectionism Problem, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 391 (1996) (using “protectionism” to
describe the refusal of local Chinese government authorities to enforce intellectual property
rights); see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of
the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 275,
280 (1997) (noting that the GATT agreement generally disfavors “protectionism” but that
GATT-TRIPS promotes intellectual property protection that itself may be deemed
“protectionist,” and concluding that even the modern vocabularies of intellectual property
and international trade “sit in uneasy contrast”).
236. There were also arguably some British precursors. For a suggestion that
protectionist trade policy and intellectual property rights were intertwined in an earlier era in
English law, see Thomas B. Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of
Regulation, 91 VA. L. REV. 1313 (2005).
237. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (limiting copyright protection to
U.S. citizens and residents); id. § 6 (limiting copyright infringement actions to those brought
by U.S. citizens or residents). Congress eliminated the citizenship restriction in 1891, but
imposed requirements for publication and manufacture in the United States. See Act of Mar.
3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106.
238. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 5, 1 Stat. at 125 (specifying that “nothing in this act
shall be construed to extend to prohibit the importation or vending, reprinting or publishing
within the United States, of any map, chart, book or books, written, printed, or published by
any person not a citizen of the United States”). See generally B. ZORINA KHAN, THE
DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION 261 (2005) (discussing the provision).
239. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318–21; cf. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357,
§ 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 [hereinafter Patent Act of 1836] (“any person or persons”).
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If design protection legislation was to be sold as a protectionist measure, what
mattered was whether the legislation privileged American firms over foreign
firms—and it did. Consistent with protectionist ambitions, the Senate amended the
pending 1842 design patent legislation in order to limit design patent protection to
citizens or aliens who resided in the United States and intended to become
citizens.243 In fact, the only amendment recorded in the Congressional Globe that
we can tie directly to the design patent provisions involved the suggestion to
restrict design patent protection to citizens.244
Viewed in its proper political context, Congress’s decision to enact design
patent legislation can be understood as an exercise implementing the Whig
protectionist agenda, not a mere accident or a mere passive congressional response
to Commissioner Ellsworth’s proposal to incorporate utility patent rules. The
citizenship provision was likely far more important to the ultimate passage of the
legislation than the suggestion to incorporate patent law rules.245

240. See Patent Act of 1836, § 9, 5 Stat. at 121 (imposing a $30 application fee for U.S.
citizens, a $300 fee for most foreigners, and a $500 fee for British applicants).
241. Id. § 15 (allowing a defense against infringement in cases where the patentee was a
foreigner and had “failed and neglected for the space of eighteen months from the date of the
patent, to put and continue on sale to the public, on reasonable terms, the invention or
discovery for which the patent issued”).
242. Compare id. § 7, with Patent Act of 1793, § 1, 1 Stat. at 318–21, and Act of Apr. 10,
1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109–10. See generally Margo A. Bagley, Patently
Unconstitutional: The Geographic Limitation on Prior Art in a Small World, 87 MINN. L.
REV. 679, 684, 696–700, (tracing the limitation’s legislative history).
243. Predecessor proposals lacked a citizenship restriction. Compare S. 220, 27th Cong.
§ 3 (1842) (“person or persons”), with Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 543–44
(“citizen or citizens, or alien or aliens, having resided one year in the United States and taken the oath
of his or their intention to become a citizen or citizens”).
244. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 840 (1842) (recording that Senator Wright—
presumably Silas J. Wright, a Van Buren Democrat from New York—suggested the
citizenship restriction, and that Senator Huntington—apparently Jabez W. Huntington, a
Whig from Connecticut—commented on the suggested amendment). The legislative package
also included some utility patent provisions, and the relatively brief debate as recorded in the
Congressional Globe appears to contain some erroneous references to bill section numbers,
so it requires some careful reconstruction to determine whether certain aspects of the debate
related to the design patent proposal. See id. (referring to citizenship amendments in “2d
section,” which should read “3d section”).
245. Indeed, in 1870, when Congress lifted the citizenship restriction, Scientific American
characterized the amendment as a great victory for the “advocates of the free trade system.”
The New Patent Laws—Important Changes Affecting American and Foreign
Manufacturers—Free Trade in Patents Now Fully Established, 23 SCI. AM. 87, 87 (1870)
(referring to Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 71, 16. Stat. 198, 209–10). During the
subsequent (Forty-Second) Congress, the Senate even passed a bill that would have again
restricted design patents to citizens. S. 583, 42d Cong. (1872) (reincorporating the
citizenship restriction for design patents only). Describing the amendment, Senator Morrill
(Vermont) bluntly stated, “The effect of this change is to allow Americans to copy any
designs that are brought here from abroad, if they choose.” CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d
Sess. 1036 (1872). The Senator also repeatedly referred to the design patent regime as
copyright and even a design registration system while championing the bill. See, e.g., id. at
817, 1036; see also id. at 1427 (recording Mr. Cox’s attempt to refer the bill to the House’s
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IV. RETHINKING THE USE OF MODERN UTILITY PATENT RULES FOR DESIGN
PATENTS
The American design patent system has had abundant time to establish itself
since the era of Mott, Ellsworth, and Ruggles, but, as we have noted, it has never
developed a clear identity. The cast-iron stove industry used the system heavily at
the outset.246 However, industry leaders quickly grew disenchanted with design
patent protection and pressed for alternative forms of protection, ultimately without
success.247
We do not prescribe the abolition of design patent protection, but we do
advocate close scrutiny of its core assumption about the feasibility of incorporating
utility patent rules. The starting point, then, should be the language in 35 U.S.C.
§ 171: the mandate that the “provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions
shall apply to patents for designs, except as otherwise provided.”248 It is the modern
statutory language responding to Ellsworth’s rather cavalier pronouncement that
the design patent system could be implemented “by simply authorizing the
Commissioner to issue patents for these objects, under the same limitations and on
the same conditions as govern present action in other cases.”249 This ostensibly
lucid and often misunderstood provision has undergone very little change since its
formulation in 1842.250 As we discuss below, a comprehensive reevaluation of
design patents’ patent character might start with a reconsideration of design patent
claiming practices and the concept of patentability of designs over the prior art. By
retaining the incorporation clause as utility patent law diverged from copyright law,
Congress has forced blind obedience to a principle that even Ellsworth might not
have supported.

Committee on the Library—which handled copyright reform—and Congressman Myers’s
rejoinder that the bill did not refer to copyright and should be referred to the House’s
Committee on Patents). Although the House might have similarly supported the bill, the
citizenship restriction was thrown into a much larger bill with several amendments that did
not emerge from the House’s Committee on Patents in time for regular order before the end
of the session. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 4329–30 (1872); To amend an act
entitled, “An act to revise, consolidate, and amend the statutes relating to patents and
copyrights,” approved July eighth, eighteen hundred and seventy, H.R. 2857, 42d Cong.
(1872) (line 105–07).
246. Indeed, the first reported design patent litigation involved stoves. Root v. Ball, 20 F.
Cas. 1157 (D. Ohio 1846) (No. 12,035); see also Howell J. Harris, “The Stove Trade Needs
Change Continually”: Designing the First Mass-Market Consumer Durable, c. 1830-1900
(working manuscript on file with authors).
247. We examine this debate in forthcoming work.
248. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2006). This section is commonly referred to as an incorporation
clause or more colloquially as a catchall.
249. See Du Mont, supra note 16, at 541 (citing HENRY L. ELLSWORTH, REPORT FROM
THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS, H.R. DOC. NO. 74, at 2 (1842)).
250. Du Mont, supra note 16, at 541–43, 547–48, 564, 578–82, 587–88, 591, 596
(discussing this section’s legislative history from the 1842 act through its modern
embodiment and how it was used as the principal vehicle for justifying the application of the
contemporary invention requirement and other utility patent standards).
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A. Design Patent Claiming Practices
The patent claim shapes much of modern utility patent analysis.251 Claim
interpretation is the threshold step in all patentability and infringement analyses and
has generated perhaps the most vibrant debates in contemporary patent law.252 A
synthesis of the canons of patent claim construction literally fills multiple
volumes.253 By virtue of the Section 171 incorporation clause, and cultural crossfertilization between utility patent and design patent practices, each design patent
includes a claim.254 Accordingly, a mechanism exists for the deep inculcation of the
utility patent claiming jurisprudence into design patent law.
Nonetheless, while design patent law is superficially indebted to utility patent
law’s claiming conventions, its commitment has been ad hoc. The concept of
peripheral claiming has never quite penetrated design patent law. Design patent
claims conventionally refer to the disclosure255 (using language such as “as shown
and described”256); that is, they resemble central claims as opposed to the
peripheral claims of the present-day utility patent.257 Since utility patent law has
moved to peripheral claiming and design patent law seemingly has not, this raises a
fundamental question about whether claim interpretation and infringement rules
typically associated with peripheral claiming systems should carry over to the
design patent regime.
Unfortunately, no coherent approach to this question has emerged from the case
law. In Gorham, the Supreme Court adopted an infringement rule that is consistent
with the notion of central claiming, in that it permitted infringement to be found
when the claimed and accused designs were “substantially the same” as viewed
from the perspective of the ordinary observer.258 Over a period of decades, courts,

251. See William Redin Woodworth, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 46
MICH. L. REV. 755, 764 (1948).
252. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Phillips v.
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
253. See, e.g., ANTHONY W. DELLER, PATENT CLAIMS (2d. ed. 1971); see also RIDSDALE
ELLIS, PATENT CLAIMS (1949); ROBERT C. FABER, FABER ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM
DRAFTING (6th ed. 2010).
254. 37 C.F.R. § 1.153(a) (2010).
255. Although design patents formerly included more detailed claims that resembled
utility patents, advances in photography and the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobson v.
Dornan, 118 U.S. 10, 14 (1886) (emphasizing that a design patent’s scope is best represented
by its drawings), cemented a shift in design patent claiming towards the simple reference to
the drawings that we see today.
256. 37 C.F.R. § 1.153(a) (requiring the claim to be “in formal terms to the ornamental
design for the article (specifying name) as shown, or as shown and described”). For a
modern example, the design patent covering Apple’s iPad includes the following claim:
“The ornamental design for a portable display device, as shown and described.” Portable
Display Device, U.S. Patent No. D-627,777, at [57] (filed Jan. 6, 2010).
257. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1776 (2009); Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming
Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 796 (2009).
258. Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall) 511, 528 (1871). There was no controversy
over the substantial similarity formulation; the main issue was whether the ordinary observer
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including the Federal Circuit, added a separate inquiry to the Gorham analysis,259
requiring a showing that the accused design appropriated the “points of novelty” of
the claimed design260—arguably bringing the design patent infringement analysis
closer to the strict element-by-element analysis associated with literal infringement
in peripheral claiming systems.261 The Federal Circuit also held that the doctrine of
equivalents—whose value is most evident in a peripheral claiming system—does
apply to design patents,262 although harmonizing it with the point of novelty test
ordinary designer should be the putative viewer of the respective designs. Id. at 527.
259. See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. SWISA, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 671 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(noting that the court had switched from treating the point of novelty inquiry conjunctively
with Gorham, to treating it as a separate test). In support of the Federal Circuit’s
“conjunctive” approach, the Egyptian Goddess court cited L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn
Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1993), and Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc.,
745 F.2d 621, 628 n.16 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Id. For examples of its application as a separate
test, the court cited Lawman Armor Corp. v. Winner Int’l, LLC, 437 F.3d 1383, 1384 (Fed.
Cir. 2006), Contessa Food Prods., Inc. v. Conagra, Inc., 282 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2002), Sun Hill Indus., Inc. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc., 48 F.3d 1193, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
and Unidynamics Corp. v. Automatic Prods. Int’l, 157 F.3d 1311, 1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Id.
260. The point of novelty test required courts to identify the elements of the patented
design that distinguished it from the prior art. See Lawman Armor Corp. v. Winner Int’l,
LLC, No. CIV.A.02-4595, 2005 WL 354103, at *4–5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2005) (identifying
eight points of novelty from the prior art), aff’d, 437 F.3d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Infringement could only be found where the accused article included the protected design’s
point of novelty (or many points of novelty, as in Lawman). See Litton Sys., Inc. v.
Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1984). It operated as a separate inquiry
from Gorham’s substantial similarity test for infringement. See Gorham, 81 U.S. at 528. In
tandem, these tests created an odd scenario where courts, on the one hand, viewed
infringement as a generalist or ordinary observer when judging overall or substantial
similarity, and on the other hand, then focused like an expert on its elements during a point
of novelty analysis. See Winner Int’l Corp. v. Wolo Mfg. Corp., 905 F.2d 375, 376 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (asserting that “[t]o consider the overall appearance of a design without regard to prior
art would eviscerate the purpose of the ‘point of novelty’ approach, which is to focus on
those aspects of a design which render the design different from prior art designs”). For
background on the Federal Circuit’s pre-Egyptian Goddess approach to the point of novelty
test, see Christopher V. Carani, The New “Extra-Ordinary” Observer Test for Design Patent
Infringement—On a Crash Course with the Supreme Court’s Precedent in Gorham v. White,
8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 354 (2009); Perry J. Saidman, What Is the Point of the
Point of Novelty Test for Design Patent Infringement?, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 401 (2008).
261. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29–30 (1997).
But see Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony California, Inc., 439 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (holding that the district court did not err by factoring out the protected design’s
elements that it deemed functional, but that it committed a procedural error by discounting
the design’s functional elements in a manner that “convert[ed] the overall infringement test
[(i.e., Gorham)] to an element-by-element comparison”).
262. Minka Lighting, Inc. v. Craftmade Int’l, Inc., 93 Fed. App’x 214, 217 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (noting that Gorham’s “substantial similarity test by its nature subsumes a doctrine of
equivalents analysis” (citing Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186, 1190 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (recognizing that “it has long been recognized that the principles of equivalency are
applicable under Gorham,” but noting the inapplicability of Graver Tank’s function-way-
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presented certain additional challenges.263 However, more recently, the Federal
Circuit ruled en banc in Egyptian Goddess that the Gorham analysis should govern
design patent infringement, shorn of any point of novelty prong or as a separate
test.264 The court has not returned to the question of whether design patentees are
entitled to invoke the doctrine of equivalents.
This vacillation between peripheral and central claiming orientations has not
been confined to the law of infringement. In the wake of its Egyptian Goddess
decision, the Federal Circuit revised its test for design patent anticipation,
eliminating the point of novelty prong that it had added only a few years
previously.265 On the other hand, notwithstanding its newfound distaste for points
of novelty, the Federal Circuit also quixotically reaffirmed266 that it is proper to
dissect a claimed design into its individual features—by vainly parsing the design’s
functional and ornamental elements—and to analyze them serially before applying
Gorham’s test for infringement to the remaining ornamental elements,267 a decision
that perhaps is influenced by an orientation towards patent claiming and the
tendency to conceive of claims as combinations of elements.268
The design patent system’s awkward embrace of utility patent claiming concepts
has also been evident in the Federal Circuit’s approach to design patent claim
construction. After a period during which the Federal Circuit routinely invoked
result test to design patents))).
263. See, e.g., Sun Hill Indus., 48 F.3d at 1199 (refusing to apply the doctrine of
equivalence where the point of novelty test had not been met).
264. Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 678 (abandoning the point of novelty test as an
element of the infringement analysis).
265. Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1240 (Fed. Cir
2009) (concluding, in light of Egyptian Goddess, that the ordinary observer test was the sole
test for anticipation); id. at 1239 (citing Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889)
(invoking the axiom, “‘[t]hat which infringes, if later, would anticipate, if earlier’”)).
266. For pre-Egyptian Goddess Federal Circuit cases affirming Richardson’s approach,
see, for example, OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1405 (Fed. Cir.
1997); Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 825–26 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Lee, 838 F.2d at
1188.
267. Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1294, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting
that if the district court had not parsed out the design’s ornamental aspects during claim
construction that it would have erroneously given the patentee’s “Stepclaw” design a claim scope
that included “the utilitarian elements of his multi-function tool,” but then attempting to reconcile
this approach with Amini’s caution that “the deception that arises is a result of the similarities in the
overall design [(i.e., infringement)], not of similarities in ornamental features in isolation” (citing
Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony California, Inc., 439 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). While
the elimination of the point of novelty test removed a substantial hurdle for design patentees,
functionality’s role in claim construction—as distinguished from a de jure functionality or validity
inquiry—will likely emerge as the design patentee’s new roadblock. See Brief of Amicus Curiae for
Apple Inc. in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Richardson, 597
F.3d 1288 (No. 08-CV-1040); Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law
Association in Support of the Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Richardson, 597 F.3d 1288 (No. 08CV-1040).
268. Cf. Int’l Seaway Trading Corp., 589 F.3d at 1244–45 (Clevenger, J., dissenting in
part) (noting how the majority’s piecemeal application of the anticipation doctrine
improperly focuses the fact finder on the design’s individual elements, as opposed to its
mandated comparison as a whole).
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claim interpretation as a threshold analysis in design patent cases,269 the court came
to recognize the difficulties associated with calling for judges to translate design
patent drawings into words as part of a claim construction exercise.270 In Egyptian
Goddess, the Federal Circuit discouraged courts from rendering verbal claim
constructions in design patent cases,271 a theme that it has reiterated more
recently.272 Yet the Federal Circuit did not wish to discard the entire panoply of
claim construction tools, so it advised courts that they might still provide
“guidance” to the fact finder by explaining the significance of statements made
during the prosecution of the design patent, for example,273 leaving open the
question of which claim construction canons might likewise be retained under the
rubric of “guidance.”
Herculean efforts such as these to stuff design patents into a utility patent box
look mildly ridiculous against the backdrop of the historical analysis that we have
offered in prior sections of this paper. As we have shown, at the outset of the
debates over U.S. design protection, there was no commitment whatsoever to a
model of substantive patent rules, and at the close of the 1842 session, when the
design patent legislation passed, there was virtually no indication that its passage
represented a congressional judgment of the inherent superiority of substantive
patent rules for designs. In any event, many of the claiming practices discussed
above did not exist in 1842. A suggestion that the design patent system avoid the
use of claims and associated claiming rules altogether would not have raised
eyebrows in 1842 and perhaps should not today either.
B. Design Patentability Standards
Another distinguishing feature of modern utility patent jurisprudence is its
heavy reliance on comparisons between the claimed invention and the prior art as
the focus of the patentability analysis. This comparison is implemented through an
elaborate rule set that defines conditions of both novelty and nonobviousness.
These rules, as they operate today, would be virtually unrecognizable to those who
originally pressed for design protection.
Nothing in the historical record commands that demonstrating differences from
the prior art be the focal point of a protectability analysis for designs. If anything,
the stove industry narrative suggests that Mott and fellow lobbyists would have
objected to a design patent regime had they understood that it would come to entail
patentability requirements in the nature of nonobviousness. One of us has detailed
in other work the circuitous path by which obviousness analysis infiltrated the
design patent regime; we need not reiterate those arguments here.274 For the

269. See, e.g., Contessa Food Prods., Inc. v. Conagra, Inc., 282 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed.
Cir. 2002); Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, Inc., 67 F.3d 1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
270. See Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1302–03 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(noting the commission’s overemphasis on its written claim construction caused it to
improperly focus on the designs’ elements, instead of their appearance as a whole).
271. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. SWISA, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 679–80 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
272. Crocs, Inc., 598 F.3d at 1302–03.
273. Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 680.
274. Du Mont, supra note 16.
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purposes of this paper, we need merely observe that the Federal Circuit has not yet
come to grips with the incorporation of the obviousness concept into the
assessment of designs.275 An argument that the entire exercise is conceptually
flawed is consistent with the historical record of design patent’s nonpatent origins.
The Federal Circuit’s commentary in International Seaway Trading Corp.276
may provide another illustration of the need to rethink design patentability
standards in view of the historical record. Section 171 requires not only that
designs be new, but also that they be “original,” a requirement that has been
included in design patent legislation since the outset277 but was rapidly swamped by
the novelty and nonobviousness requirements. In a rare commentary on the
originality requirement, the court speculated that the requirement “likely was
designed to incorporate the copyright concept of originality—requiring that the
work be original with the author.”278 Yet, as the court acknowledged, the originality
requirement was not codified in U.S. copyright law until 1909, whereas the design
patent legislation was enacted in 1842.279 In seeming resignation, the court
concluded that the overriding analogy was to utility patents after all: “the courts
have not construed the word ‘original’ as requiring that design patents be treated
differently than utility patents.”280 Providing further credence to the Federal
Circuit’s frustration, our historical analysis provides reason to question the wisdom
of keeping design patent protection in the thrall of modern patentability standards
developed under utility patent law.
CONCLUSION
What should come next for the design patent system? We do not argue here that
the design patent regime should be dismantled in favor of a sui generis design
protection regime. We do conclude that the way forward for the modern design
patent system is to ease the design patent system back towards its mixed heritage.
Our historical analysis persuades us that modern policy debates about the design
patent system have exaggerated utility patent law’s grip on design patent
jurisprudence. We conclude that Congress’s decision to enact design patent
legislation in 1842 (1) was not an implicit rejection of other (non-patent) forms of
design protection, such as design registration, and (2) was not an endorsement of
using modern utility patent rules to protect designs. Arguments for shifting design

275. Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1243–44 (Fed. Cir.
2009); Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (setting forth
an obviousness standard requiring a primary reference that has “basically the same”
appearance as the claimed design, combinable with secondary references only if they are
closely related to the primary reference).
276. 589 F.3d at 1239.
277. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2006); Ruggles Design Bill, S. 269, 26th Cong. § 1 (1841)
(granting protection to “new and original designs”). As discussed above, contemporary
British design protection similarly required the design be new and original. See supra Part
III.A.
278. Int’l Seaway, 589 F.3d at 1238.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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patent rights away from the frame of modern substantive patent law, and towards
other frameworks such as copyright or trademark, are in no way as radical as they
might seem on first blush. Indeed, they are arguments that would, ironically
enough, return the design patent debate to its original roots.

